Legal Assistance for Evictions: Impacts, Mechanisms, and Demand
Abstract
An active policy debate concerns whether to provide free legal counsel to tenants in evictioncases. We randomize provision of attorneys to tenants facing eviction in Memphis, Tennessee
(N = 307 attorneys provided). Despite landlord-friendly eviction law, providing an attorney
reduces tenant eviction judgment rates within 180 days by 23 percentage points (37%). How
ever, attorneys’ effects persist only when they can connect tenants to other services. Once
a concurrent emergency rental assistance program expires, effects on judgments at 180 days
shrink by about 75% and are indistinguishable from zero. Incentivized surveys suggest ten
ants’ demand for an attorney is double attorneys’ price, and eight times attorneys’ implied
impacts on tenants’ incomes via stopping evictions. This high willingness to pay does not ap
pear to result from elicitation errors, misperceptions, or binding budget constraints. We con
trast lawyers’ Marginal Value of Public Funds from using elicited willingness to pay (MVPF
= 2.7 without rental assistance, ignoring impacts on landlords or general equilibrium) versus
a standard calibrated approach (MVPF = 0.3) and discuss implications for the evaluation of
policies involving in-kind goods.