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Effects of Corporate Board Mandates

Paper Session

Saturday, Jan. 3, 2026 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM (EST)

Loews Philadelphia Hotel
Hosted By: American Finance Association
  • David Matsa, Northwestern University

Does Mandating Women on Corporate Boards Backfire?

Jingjing Li
,
University of Virginia
Kai Li
,
University of British Columbia
Bo Bian
,
University of British Columbia

Abstract

We examine the labor demand-side consequences of mandating female representation
on corporate boards. Using California’s SB 826 as an exogenous shock and applying
computational linguistic methods to job ads, we find that the mandate significantly
reduced treated firms’ demand for female labor. We also show that SB 826 led to fewer
female new hires, with both effects more pronounced in high individualism, Republicanleaning,
and high masculinity counties/firms. Additionally, the mandate resulted in
poorer workplace treatment of women and increased female employee turnover. Experimental
evidence points to psychological reactance and perceived violations of gender
norms as key underlying mechanisms. Our findings complement Bertrand et al. (2019),
which documents limited spillovers from a similar quota in Norway, by uncovering evidence
of backlash in less gender-equal contexts. These results highlight how misalignment
between policy goals and prevailing social norms can undermine the intended
goals of gender quotas, underscoring the need for context-specific policy design.

Board Gender Quotas and Female Borrowing: Evidence from Loan-Level Data

Fabrizio Core
,
Luiss Guido Carli University
Angelo D'Andrea
,
Bank of Italy
Tim Eisert
,
NOVA University Lisbon
Daniel Urban
,
Erasmus University Rotterdam

Abstract

We examine how female board representation influences banks' propensity to lend to female-led firms. Using the introduction of a mandatory gender quota in Italy and loan-level data, we find that as banks increase female board representation, they lend more to female-led firms, both on the extensive and intensive margins. These lending relationships extend to smaller firms but do not result in higher ex-ante or ex-post non-performing exposures. Additionally, we provide novel evidence of spillover effects from the board gender quota to rank-and-file employees, as banks promote more women. Higher promotion rates, in turn, are associated with greater female credit growth.

The Role of Mandatory Director Retirement Policies in Corporate Governance

Feng Guo
,
Iowa State University
Tingting Liu
,
University of Tennessee-Knoxville
Mohammad Ali Nari Abyaneh
,
Iowa State University

Abstract

We construct a unique dataset on mandatory retirement policies for independent directors at U.S. public firms from 1994 to 2020 by combining machine learning techniques with manual inspections. We investigate factors that drive firms to adopt mandatory retirement policies and assess the value implications of such decisions. We document an increasing trend in policy adoption, particularly among S&P 1500 firms. Our results indicate that firms with greater monitoring needs are more likely to implement mandatory retirement policies, while those with greater advising needs are less likely to do so. Moreover, mandatory retirement policies are associated with an increase in firm value when monitoring benefits are high but a decrease in value when advising benefits are high. This study is the first to examine both the determinants and outcomes of mandatory retirement policies, suggesting that their value effect depends on firms’ specific governance needs.

Discussant(s)
Paige Ouimet
,
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
Andrew Hertzberg
,
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Vyacheslav Fos
,
Boston College
JEL Classifications
  • G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance