American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy
ISSN 1945-7731 (Print) | ISSN 1945-774X (Online)
Targeting with Agents
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
(pp. 206–38)
Abstract
Targeting assistance to the poor is a central problem in development. We study the problem of designing a proxy means test when the implementing agent is corruptible. Conditioning on more poverty indicators may worsen targeting in this environment because of a novel tradeoff between statistical accuracy and enforceability. We then test necessary conditions for this tradeoff using data on Below Poverty Line card allocation in India. Less eligible households pay larger bribes and are less likely to obtain cards, but widespread rule violations yield a de facto allocation much less progressive than the de jure one. Enforceability appears to matter. (JEL D12, I32, I38, O12, O15)Citation
Niehaus, Paul, Antonia Atanassova, Marianne Bertrand, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2013. "Targeting with Agents." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 5 (1): 206–38. DOI: 10.1257/pol.5.1.206Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- I32 Measurement and Analysis of Poverty
- I38 Welfare and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration