American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy
ISSN 1945-7731 (Print) | ISSN 1945-774X (Online)
Gender-Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
(pp. 1–40)
Abstract
Gender-based taxation (GBT ) satisfies Ramsey's rule because it taxes at a lower rate the more elastic labor supply of women. We study GBT in a model in which labor elasticities emerge endogenously from intrahousehold bargaining. We explore the cases of superior bargaining power for men, higher male wages, and higher female home productivity. In all cases, men commit to a career in the market, take less home duties than women, and have lower labor supply elasticity. When society resolves its distributional concerns efficiently with gender-specific lump sum transfers, GBT with higher marginal tax rates on (single and married) men is optimal. (JEL D13, H21, H24, J16, J22)Citation
Alesina, Alberto, Andrea Ichino, and Loukas Karabarbounis. 2011. "Gender-Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 3 (2): 1–40. DOI: 10.1257/pol.3.2.1JEL Classification
- D13 Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
- H21 Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H24 Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
- J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
- J22 Time Allocation and Labor Supply