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  4. August 2017
  5. Mafia in the Ballot Box

American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy

ISSN 1945-7731 (Print) | ISSN 1945-774X (Online)

Mafia in the Ballot Box

  • Giuseppe De Feo
  • Giacomo Davide De Luca
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
vol. 9, no. 3, August 2017
(pp. 134–67)
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Abstract

We study the impact of organized crime on electoral results, analyzing in detail the national parliamentary elections in Sicily for the period 1946-1992. We document the significant support given by the Sicilian mafia to the Christian Democratic Party when the electoral competition by the Communist Party strengthened. We also provide suggestive evidence that, in exchange for its electoral support, the mafia obtained economic advantages in the construction sector.

Citation

De Feo, Giuseppe, and Giacomo Davide De Luca. 2017. "Mafia in the Ballot Box." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 9 (3): 134–67. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150551

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
  • L74 Construction