American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics
ISSN 1945-7782 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7790 (Online)
Information Systems, Service Delivery, and Corruption: Evidence from the Bangladesh Civil Service
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
(pp. 414–45)
Abstract
Slow public service delivery and corruption are common problems in low- and middle-income countries. Can better management information systems improve delivery speed? Does improving the delivery speed reduce corruption? In a large-scale experiment with the Bangladesh Civil Service, I send monthly scorecards measuring delays in service delivery to government officials and their supervisors. The scorecards increase on-time service delivery by 11 percent but do not reduce bribes. Instead, the scorecards increase bribes for high-performing bureaucrats. A model where bureaucrats' reputational concerns constrain bribes can explain the results. When positive performance feedback improves bureaucrats' reputations, the constraint is relaxed, and bribes increase.Citation
Mattsson, Martin. 2025. "Information Systems, Service Delivery, and Corruption: Evidence from the Bangladesh Civil Service." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 17 (3): 414–45. DOI: 10.1257/app.20230672Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- H83 Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
- O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements