American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics
ISSN 1945-7782 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7790 (Online)
From Immediate Acceptance to Deferred Acceptance: Effects on School Admissions and Achievement in England
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
(pp. 44–87)
Abstract
Countries and cities around the world increasingly rely on centralized systems for student placement. Two algorithms, deferred acceptance (DA) and immediate acceptance (IA), are widespread. We investigate the effects of the national ban of IA in England. Before the ban, 49 local authorities used DA and 16 used IA; all switched to DA afterward. We find that the elimination of IA reduces measures of school quality for low-SES students more than high-SES students.This effect is primarily driven by a decrease in low-SES admissions at selective schools. Our findings point to an unintended consequence of the IA to DA transition.Citation
Terrier, Camille, Parag A. Pathak, and Kevin Ren. 2026. "From Immediate Acceptance to Deferred Acceptance: Effects on School Admissions and Achievement in England." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 18 (1): 44–87. DOI: 10.1257/app.20230056Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H52 National Government Expenditures and Education
- H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
- I21 Analysis of Education
- I28 Education: Government Policy