American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics
ISSN 1945-7782 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7790 (Online)
The Impact of Presidential Appointment of Judges: Montesquieu or the Federalists?
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
(pp. 411–45)
Abstract
A central question in development economics is whether there are adequate checks and balances on the executive. This paper provides causal evidence of how increasing constraints on the executive—via removal of presidential discretion in judicial appointments—promotes the rule of law. The age structure of judges at the time of the reform and the mandatory retirement age law provide us with an exogenous source of variation in the termination of presidential discretion in judicial appointments. Overall, the results indicate that presidential appointment of judges deteriorates the rule of law. Even one degree of separation between the judiciary and the president matters.Citation
Mehmood, Sultan. 2022. "The Impact of Presidential Appointment of Judges: Montesquieu or the Federalists?" American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 14 (4): 411–45. DOI: 10.1257/app.20210176Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- K40 Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
- O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements