American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics
ISSN 1945-7782 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7790 (Online)
Does Discipline Decrease Police Misconduct? Evidence from Chicago Civilian Allegations
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
(pp. 80–116)
Abstract
Reformers are calling for greater oversight of police behavior, in part through enhanced use of civilian complaints. However, others counter that greater oversight could chill effective policing. We assess police officer response to administrative determinations of misconduct. Using Chicago data, we find strong evidence that a sustained allegation reduces that officer's future misconduct. We find no evidence that this effect is driven by incapacitation, such as assignment to desk duty, or by officer disengagement. We conclude that our findings are most consistent with improved officer conduct, in part from oversight and officer concerns over promotion, salary, and desirable assignments.Citation
Rozema, Kyle, and Max Schanzenbach. 2023. "Does Discipline Decrease Police Misconduct? Evidence from Chicago Civilian Allegations." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 15 (3): 80–116. DOI: 10.1257/app.20200568Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- H76 State and Local Government: Other Expenditure Categories
- J45 Public Sector Labor Markets
- K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- M54 Personnel Economics: Labor Management