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  3. American Economic Review: Insights
  4. September 2026
  5. Screening Adaptive Cartels

American Economic Review: Insights

ISSN 2640-205X (Print) | ISSN 2640-2068 (Online)

Screening Adaptive Cartels

  • Juan Ortner
  • Sylvain Chassang
  • Kei Kawai
American Economic Review: Insights
vol. 8, no. 3, September 2026
(pp. 285–302)
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Abstract

We propose an equilibrium theory of data-driven antitrust oversight in which regulators launch investigations on the basis of suspicious bidding patterns and cartels can adapt to the statistical screens used by regulators. Our main result establishes that screening for collusion using tests with a low false-positive rate (safe tests) is a robust improvement over laissez-faire. Safe tests do not create new collusive equilibria and do not hurt competitive industries. In addition, safe tests can have strict bite, including unraveling all collusive equilibria in some settings.

Citation

Ortner, Juan, Sylvain Chassang, and Kei Kawai. 2026. "Screening Adaptive Cartels." American Economic Review: Insights 8 (3): 285–302. DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20250233

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D21 Firm Behavior: Theory
  • D43 Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
  • D44 Auctions
  • K21 Antitrust Law
  • L12 Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
  • L14 Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks