American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules
American Economic Review
(pp. 150–168)
Abstract
In this paper I analyze the effect of transparency on decision making in committees. I focus on committees whose members are motivated by career concerns. The main result is that when the decision-making process is secretive (when individual votes are not revealed to the public), committee members comply with preexisting biases. For example, if the voting rule demands a supermajority to accept a reform, individuals vote more often against reforms. Transparent committees are therefore more likely to accept reforms. I also find that coupled with the right voting rule, a secretive procedure may induce better decisions than a transparent one. (JEL D71, D72)Citation
Levy, Gilat. 2007. "Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules." American Economic Review 97 (1): 150–168. DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.1.150JEL Classification
- D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior