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  3. American Economic Review
  4. March 2000
  5. Elephants

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Elephants

  • Michael Kremer
  • Charles Morcom
American Economic Review
vol. 90, no. 1, March 2000
(pp. 212–234)
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Abstract

Many open-access resources, such as elephants, are used to produce storable goods. Anticipated future scarcity of these resources will increase current prices and poaching. This implies that, for given initial conditions, there may be rational expectations equilibria leading to both extinction and survival. The cheapest way for governments to eliminate extinction equilibria may be to commit to tough antipoaching measures if the population falls below a threshold. For governments without credibility, the cheapest way to eliminate extinction equilibria may be to accumulate a sufficient stockpile of the storable good and threaten to sell it should the population fall.

Citation

Kremer, Michael, and Charles Morcom. 2000. "Elephants." American Economic Review 90 (1): 212–234. DOI: 10.1257/aer.90.1.212

JEL Classification

  • Q21 Renewable Resources and Conservation: Demand and Supply (the Commons