American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Comparisons of Signals
American Economic Review
(pp. 2981–3006)
Abstract
A signal is a description of an information source that specifies both its correlation with the state and its correlation with other signals. Extending Blackwell (1953), we characterize when one signal is more valuable than another regardless of preferences and regardless of access to other signals. This comparison is equivalent to reveal-or-refine: every realization of the more valuable signal reveals the state or refines the realization of the less valuable signal. We also study other comparisons of signals, including sufficiency, martingale dominance, and Lehmann. Reveal-or-refine is also equivalent to making any of these comparisons robust to access to other signals.Citation
Brooks, Benjamin, Alexander Frankel, and Emir Kamenica. 2024. "Comparisons of Signals." American Economic Review 114 (9): 2981–3006. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230430Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C90 Design of Experiments: General
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness