American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Employers and Unemployment Insurance Take-Up
American Economic Review
(pp. 2529–73)
Abstract
We quantify the employer's role in unemployment insurance (UI) take-up. Employer effects on claiming and appeals are substantial, and those effects are negatively correlated, consistent with appeals deterring claims. Low-wage workers are less likely to claim and more likely to have their claims appealed than median-wage workers. Employer effects help explain these income gradients, so equalizing employer effects on claiming would increase the progressivity of UI. Finally, the main source of targeting error in UI is that eligible workers do not claim.Citation
Lachowska, Marta, Isaac Sorkin, and Stephen A. Woodbury. 2025. "Employers and Unemployment Insurance Take-Up." American Economic Review 115 (8): 2529–73. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230195Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- J22 Time Allocation and Labor Supply
- J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J63 Labor Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
- J64 Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- J65 Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings