American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Waiting Lists
American Economic Review
(pp. 3876–3910)
Abstract
This paper introduces a stylized model to capture distinctive features of waiting list allocation mechanisms. First, agents choose among items with associated expected wait times. Waiting times serve a similar role to that of monetary prices in directing agents' choices and rationing items. Second, the expected wait for an item is endogenously determined and randomly fluctuates over time. We evaluate welfare under these endogenously determined waiting times and find that waiting time fluctuations lead to misallocation and welfare loss. A simple randomized assignment policy can reduce misallocation and increase welfare.Citation
Leshno, Jacob D. 2022. "Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Waiting Lists." American Economic Review 112 (12): 3876–3910. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201111Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D61 Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness