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  3. American Economic Review
  4. March 2006
  5. Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach

  • Patrick W. Schmitz
American Economic Review
vol. 96, no. 1, March 2006
(pp. 422–434)
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Abstract

The property rights approach to the theory of the firm suggests that ownership structures are chosen in order to provide ex ante investment incentives, while bargaining is ex post efficient. In contrast, transaction cost economics emphasizes ex post inefficiencies. In the present paper, a party may invest and acquire private information about the default payoff that it can realize on its own. Inefficient rent seeking can overturn prominent implications of the property rights theory. In particular, ownership by party B may be optimal, even though only the indispensable party A makes an investment decision.

Citation

Schmitz, Patrick, W. 2006. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach." American Economic Review 96 (1): 422–434. DOI: 10.1257/000282806776157722

JEL Classification

  • D23 Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
  • D21 Firm Behavior: Theory