This website uses cookies.

By clicking the "Accept" button or continuing to browse our site, you agree to first-party and session-only cookies being stored on your device to enhance site navigation and analyze site performance and traffic. For more information on our use of cookies, please see our Privacy Policy.

  1. Home
  2. Journals
  3. American Economic Review
  4. June 2003
  5. School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach

  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu
  • Tayfun Sönmez
American Economic Review
vol. 93, no. 3, June 2003
(pp. 729–747)
Download Full Text PDF

Abstract

A central issue in school choice is the design of a student assignment mechanism. Education literature provides guidance for the design of such mechanisms but does not offer specific mechanisms. The flaws in the existing school choice plans result in appeals by unsatisfied parents. We formulate the school choice problem as a mechanism design problem and analyze some of the existing school choice plans including those in Boston, Columbus, Minneapolis, and Seattle. We show that these existing plans have serious shortcomings, and offer two alternative mechanisms each of which may provide a practical solution to some critical school choice issues.

Citation

Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, and Tayfun Sönmez. 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach ." American Economic Review 93 (3): 729–747. DOI: 10.1257/000282803322157061

JEL Classification

  • I20 Education and Research Institutions: General
  • D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design