AEA Papers and Proceedings
ISSN 2574-0768 (Print) | ISSN 2574-0776 (Online)
Efficient Full Implementation via Transfers: Uniqueness and Sensitivity in Symmetric Environments
AEA Papers and Proceedings
(pp. 438–43)
Abstract
We study efficient full implementation via transfers in unique rationalizable strategies in environments that are symmetric in two senses: first, agents display the same total level of preference interdependence; second, types are commonly known to be drawn from distributions with identical (but unknown) means. We characterize the conditions under which full efficient implementation is possible via direct mechanisms, as well as the transfer schemes that achieve it whenever possible. We discuss a further robustness property—robustness to mistaken play—and show that it uniquely selects the transfer scheme that induces an even redistribution of strategic externalities.Citation
Ollár, Mariann, and Antonio Penta. 2022. "Efficient Full Implementation via Transfers: Uniqueness and Sensitivity in Symmetric Environments." AEA Papers and Proceedings 112: 438–43. DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20221088Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- D62 Externalities
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H23 Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies