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  3. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
  4. November 2013
  5. Bargaining with Deadlines and Private Information

American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics

ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)

Bargaining with Deadlines and Private Information

  • William Fuchs
  • Andrzej Skrzypacz
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 5, no. 4, November 2013
(pp. 219–43)
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Abstract

We study dynamic bargaining with private information and a deadline. As commitment power disappears, there is a clear "deadline effect." That is, trade takes place smoothly before the deadline and with an atom right at the deadline. Prices, timing of trade, and the deadline effect respond to the consequences of not reaching an agreement. Bleaker disagreement options lead to more trade and proportionally more of the agreements taking place on the verge of the deadline. Time to deadline can affect the overall efficiency of the equilibrium nonmonotonically. For intermediate deadlines, efficiency is improved if agents face bleaker prospects after deadline.

Citation

Fuchs, William, and Andrzej Skrzypacz. 2013. "Bargaining with Deadlines and Private Information." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5 (4): 219–43. DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.4.219

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design