American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
(Pro-)Social Learning and Strategic Disclosure
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 102–25)
Abstract
We study a sequential experimentation model with endogenous feedback. Agents choose between a safe and risky action, the latter generating stochastic rewards. When making this choice, each agent is selfishly motivated (myopic). However, agents can disclose their experiences to a public record, and when doing so are prosocially motivated (forward-looking). Disclosure is both polarized (only extreme signals are disclosed) and positively biased (no feedback is bad news). The extent of disclosure is non-monotone in prior uncertainty. Subsidizing disclosure costs can paradoxically lead to less disclosure, but more experimentation.Citation
Bénabou, Roland, and Nikhil Vellodi. 2025. "(Pro-)Social Learning and Strategic Disclosure." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 17 (4): 102–25. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240190Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D81 Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness