American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Heterogeneous Noise and Stable Miscoordination
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 1–32)
Abstract
Coordination games feature two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experience miscoordination. We investigate learning dynamics where agents observe the actions of a random sample of their opponents. First, we show that when all agents have the same sample size, whether it is small or large, their behavior converges to one of the pure coordinated equilibria. By contrast, our main results show that stable miscoordination often persists when some agents make decisions based on small samples while others rely on large samples.Citation
Arigapudi, Srinivas, Yuval Heller, and Amnon Schreiber. 2025. "Heterogeneous Noise and Stable Miscoordination." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 17 (4): 1–32. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240109Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C72 Noncooperative Games
- C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory