Journal of Economic Perspectives
ISSN 0895-3309 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7965 (Online)
An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes
Journal of Economic Perspectives
(pp. 3–26)
(Complimentary)
Abstract
Many researchers, following Kenneth Arrow's lead, have concerned themselves with stating various desirable or undesirable criteria and attempting to classify vote-counting systems. This paper moves away from theoretical discussions: the authors illustrate and motivate a variety of alternatives to plurality rule. The authors demonstrate by example how these alternatives, such as min-max majority and single transferable vote, work and where they fail. In choosing between flawed alternatives, which methods are best suited for selecting a single winner versus ranking the candidates? Does one approach favor candidates with loyal minorities or candidates with broad appeal? How do the authors achieve a representative outcome?Citation
Levin, Jonathan, and Barry Nalebuff. 1995. "An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes." Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 (1): 3–26. DOI: 10.1257/jep.9.1.3JEL Classification
- D72 Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior