Journal of Economic Perspectives
ISSN 0895-3309 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7965 (Online)
Anomalies: Cooperation
Journal of Economic Perspectives
(pp. 187–197)
(Complimentary)
Abstract
Much economic analysis — and virtually all game theory — starts with the assumption that people are both rational and selfish. The predictions derived from this assumption of rational selfishness are, however, violated in many familiar contexts. In this column and the next one, the evidence from laboratory experiments is examined to see what has been learned about when and why humans cooperate. This column considers the particularly important case of cooperation vs. free riding in the context of public good provision.Citation
Dawes, Robyn M., and Richard H. Thaler. 1988. "Anomalies: Cooperation." Journal of Economic Perspectives 2 (3): 187–197. DOI: 10.1257/jep.2.3.187JEL Classification
- C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D11 Consumer Economics: Theory
- D64 Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
- D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
- H41 Public Goods