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  3. Journal of Economic Perspectives
  4. Summer 1987
  5. Tax Reform as Political Choice

Journal of Economic Perspectives

ISSN 0895-3309 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7965 (Online)

Tax Reform as Political Choice

  • James M. Buchanan
Journal of Economic Perspectives
vol. 1, no. 1, Summer 1987
(pp. 29–35)
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Abstract

Public choice theory explains and interprets politics as the interaction among constituents and agents seeking to advance or to express their own interests. Applied to an observed political event like the 1986 tax reform legislation, any such analysis must identify the effects on separate interests and make some presumption concerning the perception of these effects. The linkage between assigning gains and losses from the 1986 tax changes and explaining these changes depends critically on the model of political choice. Political reality presumably embodies some mix of models of consensus, conflict, and agents' discretion. These three models are examined separately, with features from each retaining some explanatory value.

Citation

Buchanan, James M. 1987. "Tax Reform as Political Choice." Journal of Economic Perspectives 1 (1): 29–35. DOI: 10.1257/jep.1.1.29

JEL Classification

  • D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • H24 Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
  • H25 Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
  • K34 Tax Law