American Economic Review: Insights
ISSN 2640-205X (Print) | ISSN 2640-2068 (Online)
How Test-Optional Policies in College Admissions Disproportionately Harm High-Achieving Applicants from Disadvantaged Backgrounds
American Economic Review: Insights
(pp. 393–408)
Abstract
We analyze data from one elite institution and find that test score-optional policies harm the likelihood of admission for high-achieving applicants from disadvantaged backgrounds. Under test-optional policies, these applicants submit test scores at too low a rate; they more than double their admission probability (from 2.9 percent to 7.2 percent) by reporting scores. Our findings suggest that, more than commonly understood, elite institutions interpret test scores in the context of an applicant's background. Thus, availability of test scores on an application can promote rather than hinder social mobility.Citation
Sacerdote, Bruce, Douglas O. Staiger, and Michele Tine. 2026. "How Test-Optional Policies in College Admissions Disproportionately Harm High-Achieving Applicants from Disadvantaged Backgrounds." American Economic Review: Insights 8 (3): 393–408. DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20250177Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- I23 Higher Education; Research Institutions
- I28 Education: Government Policy