

Global Networks, Monetary Policy and Trade

Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan

Brown University

Can Soylu

Brown University

Muhammed A. Yıldırım

Harvard University

AEA P&P Paper: Global Trade, Tariff Uncertainty, and the U.S. Dollar

AEA ASSA 2026


How do tariffs affect the macroeconomy in the presence of global I-O networks?

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Two related questions:

- Why do networks matter for macro impact of tariffs?
- Can global networks be re-shaped under large country import tariffs?

Global trade and production network—Complicated, hard to change



Source: OECD ICIO

Reserach Agenda

Develop tractable N -country, J -sector New Keynesian Open Economy (NKOE) framework:

- Full input-output (I-O) linkages across countries and sectors,
- Unbalanced trade and incomplete markets,
- Nominal rigidity, combining PCP&DCP.

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Results:

- Derive the *NKOE Leontief inverse*, which governs propagation **across time**
- Network can make inflation more persistent and decline in output bigger
- 2018 road test: match 7% appreciation of the dollar
- 2025 tariffs: most models deliver appreciation of the dollar.
- **2025 Reality: depreciation**

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
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
Today's Paper: Additional Shock—Tariff Threats (trade uncertainty)

Consumption shares Γ : ToT gains vs. distorted labor supply




Primitives

I-O matrix Ω : ToT gains vs. higher marginal cost propagated by network




Primitives

EoS θ : high $\theta \Rightarrow$ easy to substitute $\Rightarrow \hat{Y}_t \uparrow$ or low $\theta \Rightarrow$ complements & bottlenecks, $\rightarrow \hat{Y}_t \downarrow$




Primitives

Stickiness Λ : Combines PCP&DCP. Low $\Lambda \Rightarrow$ flatter NKPC or high $\Lambda \Rightarrow$ steeper NKPC




Primitives

Policy Φ : response to $\pi_t^P \Rightarrow$ tariffs contract demand



Primitives

Tariffs lead to intertemporal tradeoffs \Leftrightarrow via expectations



5-Equation Global New Keynesian Representation

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NKIS+TR:

$$\sigma(\mathbb{E}_t \hat{\mathbf{C}}_{t+1} - \hat{\mathbf{C}}_t) = \underbrace{\Phi \Gamma \pi_t^P}_{\hat{i}_t} - \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}^C$$

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Expectations



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Policy (blue arrow pointing to $\Phi \Gamma \pi_t^P$)

Expectations (red arrow pointing to $\mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}^C$)

5-Equation Global New Keynesian Representation

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CPI:

$$\underbrace{\hat{\mathbf{P}}_t^C}_{\text{Consumer Prices}} = \underbrace{\Gamma}_{\text{Consumption Weights}} \underbrace{\hat{\mathbf{P}}_t^P}_{\text{Producer Prices}} + \underbrace{L_{\varepsilon}^C}_{\text{ER}} \underbrace{\hat{\mathbf{E}}_t}_{\text{ER}} + \underbrace{L_{\tau}^C}_{\text{Tariff}} \underbrace{\hat{\tau}_t}_{\text{Tariff}}$$

5-Equation Global New Keynesian Representation

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NKPC:

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CPI: $\hat{\mathbf{P}}_t^C = \Gamma \hat{\mathbf{P}}_t^P + \mathbf{L}_\varepsilon^C \hat{\mathbf{C}}_t + \mathbf{L}_\tau^C \hat{\tau}_t$ **Costlier Inputs**

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MC without $\hat{\mathbf{P}}_t^P$

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BoP:

$$\underbrace{\beta \hat{V}_t}_{\text{Debt}} = \underbrace{\hat{V}_{t-1}}_{\text{Debt Dynamics}} + \underbrace{\Xi_2 \hat{\mathbf{C}}_t + \Xi_3 \hat{\mathbf{P}}_t^P + \Xi_4 \hat{\mathcal{E}}_t + \Xi_5 \hat{\tau}_t}_{\text{NX Response to AD \& ToT}}$$

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Relative Demand



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
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+ inflation definition



Inflation-Output Tradeoff with Global Production Networks

Example: Near-permanent tariff and w/o MP Response




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


U.S. exchange rate appreciates between 5 to 10%


Reality: The Dollar Depreciated after Liberation Day



Dollar Depreciation: Broad Dollar vs Euro




(a) Broad US Dollar Index




(b) USD–EUR Exchange Rate

Simultaneous Increase in Policy Uncertainty



(a) Trade Policy Uncertainty



(b) U.S. Economic Policy Uncertainty

AEA P&P Paper: Global Trade, Tariff Uncertainty, and the U.S. Dollar

5-Equation Global Representation—Simple Case (2 country, 1 good, flex-P)

Euler (H):

$$(\mathbb{E}_t \hat{C}_{H,t+1} - \hat{C}_{H,t}) = \hat{i}_{H,t} + \underbrace{\frac{1}{2} \text{Var}_t(\hat{C}_{H,t+1})}_{\eta \sigma_t^2}$$

Euler (F):

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5-Equation Global Representation—Simpler Model (2 country, 1 good, flex price)

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UIP: $\hat{i}_{H,t} - \hat{i}_{F,t} = \mathbb{E}_t(\hat{\mathcal{E}}_{t+1} - \hat{\mathcal{E}}_t) + \underbrace{\text{Var}_t(\hat{\mathcal{E}}_{t+1})}_{\kappa \sigma_t^2}$

5-Equation Global Representation Under Flex Price and No Networks

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Goods Mkt (F):

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5-Equation Global Representation Under Flex Price and No Networks

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UIP:

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CPI (H):

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BoP:


$$\beta \hat{V}_t = \hat{V}_{t-1} + \underbrace{\gamma}_{\Xi_2} (\hat{C}_{H,t} - \hat{C}_{F,t}) + \underbrace{(-\gamma)}_{\Xi_4} \hat{\varepsilon}_t + \underbrace{(-\gamma)}_{\Xi_5} \hat{\tau}_t$$

Tariff vs Tariff Volatility Impact on Exchange Rate

$$\hat{\varepsilon}_t = \underbrace{\left(\left(R_H^{-1} - \frac{1}{2} \right) (1 - 2\gamma)^2 - \frac{1}{2} \right)}_{<0} \hat{\tau}_t + \underbrace{R_H^{-1} (1 - 2\gamma)^2 (\eta + \kappa)}_{>0} \sigma_t^2 + \underbrace{\frac{(1 - R_H^{-1}) (1 - 2\gamma)^2}{\gamma}}_{>0} \hat{V}_{H,t-1}$$

- Both HH and financial inter-mediation are sensitive to risk.
- Higher uncertainty means precautionary saving, lower demand for goods/dollar, higher expected excess returns to dollars.


Tariff Threats - Not implemented and future implementation uncertain




SOURCE: Trade Compliance Resource Hub Trump 2.0 Tariff Tracker.

Our volatility measure: For each day t , we compute the standard deviation of all announced and threatened tariff rates observed up to (and including) day t . (mean: 43%; 72, 60, 49 during 2025)

Exchange Rate Responses to Tariff Level and Volatility Shocks: Agents Expectations and Volatility Shock Persistence Matter



(a) Exchange Rate Model Responses to Level and Volatility Shocks: 18% level, 72% volatility



(b) Comparing Model IRFs to Data with A Series of One-Time Volatility Shocks

Takeaways

1. With global trade and production networks, macro impact of tariffs is different than canonical models: π_t can be more persistent and decline in $RGDP$ can be bigger

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2. Why? Tariffs work as 3 separate shocks:

Takeaways


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2. Why? Tariffs work as 3 separate shocks:
 - Consumption tax, distorting intertemporal consumption and labor supply choice
 - Cost push shock, all sectors' marginal costs are linked
 - Risk sharing shock: wealth transfer from F to H under unilateral tariffs

Takeaways


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2. Why? Tariffs work as 3 separate shocks:
 - Consumption tax, distorting intertemporal consumption and labor supply choice
 - Cost push shock, all sectors' marginal costs are linked
 - Risk sharing shock: wealth transfer from F to H under unilateral tariffs
3. Tariffs lead to home currency appreciation unless accompanied by tariff uncertainty
⇒ depreciation
 - Via higher UIP premia and households' precautionary savings
 - **Rogoff (2025):** Currency dominance/reserve currency status erosion
⇒ (tariff volatility subsides but safe country/currency came under suspicion; possible acceleration of erosion of confidence.)

Appendix: Model

Decomposing the UIP Condition and Excess Currency Returns




(a) Interest Differential and Depreciation




(b) UIP and Excess Currency Returns

Exchange Response


Example: Near-permanent tariff and w/o MP Response



Dollar Depreciation: Broad Dollar Without Euro vs Euro




(a) Broad US Dollar Index Without USD-EUR



(b) USD–EUR Exchange Rate

NOTE: Positive values indicate depreciation of the US dollar and negative values indicate appreciation.

Tariff Volatility Measure



SOURCE: Trade Compliance Resource Hub Trump 2.0 Tariff Tracker.

Our volatility measure: For each day t , we compute the standard deviation of all announced and threatened tariff rates observed up to (and including) day t .

Network Model Overview: NK Block

1. Rotemberg costs, producer pricing and dollar pricing
2. Firm f in country-sector mj pricing for importer in country n :

$$P_{n,mj,t}^f = \arg \max_{P_{n,mj,t}^P} \mathbb{E}_t \left[\sum_{T=t}^{\infty} \text{SDF}_{t,T} \left[Y_{n,mj,T}^f(P_{n,mj,T}^f) (P_{n,mj,T}^f - MC_{mj,T}) \right. \right. \\ \left. \left. - \frac{\delta_{mj}}{2} \left[(1 - \vartheta_{n,mj}) \left(\frac{P_{n,mj,T}^f}{P_{n,mj,T-1}^f} - 1 \right)^2 + \vartheta_{n,mj} \left(\frac{\mathcal{E}_{n,T-1}^{US} P_{n,mj,T}^f}{\mathcal{E}_{n,T}^{US} P_{n,mj,T-1}^f} - 1 \right)^2 \right] Y_{n,mj,T} P_{n,mj,T}^P \right] \right]$$

3. Producer price has nominal rigidity, combining PCP & DCP with $\vartheta_{ni} \in [0, 1] \rightarrow$ share of prices rigid in dominant currency.
4. Endogenous markups due to monopolistic competition+nominal rigidity

Network Model Overview: Open Econ Block

1. The household in country n maximizes the present value of lifetime utility:

$$\max_{\{C_{n,t}, L_{n,t}, B_{n,t}^{US}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[\frac{C_{n,t}^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} - \chi \frac{L_{n,t}^{1+\eta}}{1+\eta} \right] \text{ s.t.}$$

$$P_{n,t}^C C_{n,t} + T_{n,t} - B_{n,t} - \varepsilon_{n,t}^{US} B_{n,t}^{US} + \varepsilon_{n,t}^{US} P_{n,t}^{US} \psi(B_{n,t}^{US}/P_{n,t}^{US}) \leq$$

$$W_{n,t} L_{n,t} + \sum_i \Pi_{ni,t} - (1 + i_{n,t-1}) B_{n,t-1} - \varepsilon_{n,t}^{US} (1 + i_{n,t-1}^{US}) B_{n,t-1}^{US}$$

2. Evolution of each country n 's net international position:

$$\begin{aligned} & \sum_{m \in \mathcal{N}} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \left(\frac{P_{n,mj,t}}{1 + \tau_{n,mi,t}} C_{n,mj,t} \right) + \sum_{m \in \mathcal{N}} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \left(\frac{P_{n,mj,t}}{1 + \tau_{n,mi,t}} \chi_{ni,mj,t} \right) + \varepsilon_{n,t} (1 + i_{n,t-1}^{US}) B_{n,t-1}^{US} \\ & + \varepsilon_{n,t} P_{n,t}^{US} \psi(B_{n,t}^{US}/P_{n,t}^{US}) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} P_{ni,t} Y_{ni,t} + \varepsilon_{n,t} B_{n,t}^{US} \quad \forall n \in N-1 \end{aligned}$$

to account for tariffs lump-sum rebate, we divide $P_{n,mi,t}$ by $1 + \tau_{n,mi,t}$.

Tariffs and Prices

- German cars+American cars+ Japanese cars $\rightarrow C_t^{cars}$; $C_t^{cars} + C_t^{food} \rightarrow C_t$
- German steel+Canadian steel \rightarrow American car production
- n : Importing country, m : Exporting country, j : Exporting Industry.
 - $P_{n,i,t}^C$: Local currency consumer price of bundle i in country n (e.g., car bundle for American consumers)
 - $P_{ni,j,t}^X$: Price of intermediate (X) bundle j in for country n in industry i (e.g., car bundle for American services industry).
- The price of mj in country n can be written as:

$$\underbrace{P_{n,mj,t}}_{\text{Price of German cars in US}} = \underbrace{P_{mj,t}}_{\text{Producer Price}} \underbrace{\mathcal{E}_{n,m,t}}_{\text{Exchange Rate}} \underbrace{(1 + \tau_{n,mj,t})}_{\text{Tariff on German cars by US}}$$

- Recall: Producer price has nominal rigidity, combining PCP & DCP with $\vartheta_{ni} \in [0, 1] \rightarrow$ share of prices rigid in dominant currency.

Analytical Solution: Decomposing the Impact on Inflation

Theoretical Example: U.S. 10% Tariffs on RoW

Based on the analytical solution:


$$\begin{aligned}
 \frac{\partial \pi_t^C}{\partial \hat{\tau}_t} = & \underbrace{L_\tau^C}_{\text{Direct CPI Effect}} + \underbrace{\Gamma L_\tau^P}_{\text{Direct PPI Effect}} \\
 & + \underbrace{\Gamma \alpha L_\tau^C}_{\text{Direct Effect on Real Wages}} + \underbrace{\Gamma \alpha \sigma c_\tau}_{\text{Demand Channel}} \\
 & + \underbrace{(\Gamma(\alpha L_\varepsilon^C + L_\varepsilon^P) + L_\varepsilon^C) e_\tau}_{\text{ER Channel}} + \underbrace{\beta \Gamma \Lambda^{-1} p_v v_\tau}_{\text{Debt Channel}} \\
 & + \underbrace{\Gamma \left([\tilde{\Psi}_\Lambda^{-1} - \beta(\rho I + \Psi^{\text{NKOE}})]^{-1} \Lambda - I \right) H}_{\text{Propagation via Network \& Stickiness}}
 \end{aligned}$$

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



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 \end{aligned}$$



Baseline: 2025 Tariffs

- Implemented tariffs (mostly unilateral), country-sector as of October 23, 2025.
- Near-permanent shock.




Scaling One-Time Tariff Volatility Shock: Observed UIP Risk Premia

- Uncertainty can widen the UIP premium $\epsilon_t^\psi \uparrow$

$$\hat{i}_{n,t} - \hat{i}_{m,t} = \mathbb{E}_t \hat{c}_{n,m,t+1} - \hat{c}_{n,m,t} + \epsilon_t^\psi$$

- Following Kalemli-Özcan and Varela (2021), we use Consensus survey data:
 - UIP premium widened by 2-5pp around 2025 tariff announcements
- In Kalemli-Özcan et al. (2025) we feed in a one-time volatility shock scaled to match the size of the UIP wedge in 1Q2025 (2.98%)
 - In Kalemli-Özcan et al. (2026), we feed in a series of unexpected one-time volatility shocks in consecutive periods



Appendix: Risk Sharing Wedge in Networks

The Risk Sharing Wedge

- Defining the real exchange rate as $\hat{Q}_t = \hat{P}_t^F + \hat{\varepsilon}_t - \hat{P}_t^C$, the Backus -Smith condition in expectation ($\sigma(\mathbb{E}_t \Delta \hat{C}_{H,t+1} - \Delta \hat{C}_{F,t+1}) = \mathbb{E}_t \Delta \hat{Q}_{t+1}$) is a martingale:

$$\hat{w}_t \equiv \hat{Q}_t - \sigma(\hat{C}_{H,t} - \hat{C}_{F,t}), \quad \hat{w}_t = \mathbb{E}_t \hat{w}_{t+1}$$

- 3 cases for the risk sharing wedge, \hat{w}_t :
 - Complete markets: $\hat{w}_t = 0$
 - Incomplete markets: $0 < \hat{w}_t < \infty$
 - Financial autarky limit \rightarrow large PAC \rightarrow larger wedge

The Risk Sharing Wedge

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 - Complete markets: $\hat{w}_t = 0$
 - Incomplete markets: $0 < \hat{w}_t < \infty$
 - Financial autarky limit \rightarrow large PAC \rightarrow larger wedge
- For a given shock $\hat{\tau}_0$ and persistence ρ , the wedge is time-invariant

$$\hat{w}_t = L_\tau^Q \hat{\tau}_0, \quad \forall t \geq 0,$$

- L_τ^Q captures valuation/ToT gains as it is a function of \hat{V}_t and \mathbf{P}_t^P

3 Aspects of Tariff Shocks

The risk sharing wedge yields a three-equation representation:

$$\mathbf{NKIS+TR:} \quad \sigma(\mathbb{E}_t \hat{\mathbf{C}}_{t+1} - \hat{\mathbf{C}}_t) = \underbrace{\Phi \Gamma \pi_t^P}_{\hat{\mathbf{i}}_t} - \underbrace{(\Gamma(\mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}^P) + \mathbf{L}_{\mathcal{E}}^C(\mathbb{E}_t \hat{\mathcal{E}}_{t+1} - \hat{\mathcal{E}}_t) + (\rho - 1) \mathbf{L}_{\tau}^C \hat{\tau}_t)}_{\mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}^C}$$

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NKPC:
$$\pi_t^P = \Lambda \left[\underbrace{(\Omega - I) \hat{\mathbf{P}}_t^P + \alpha \left(\underbrace{\Gamma \hat{\mathbf{P}}_t^P + \mathbf{L}_\varepsilon^C \hat{\mathbf{C}}_t + \mathbf{L}_\tau^C \hat{\tau}_t + \sigma \hat{\mathbf{C}}_t}_{\text{Nominal Wage}} \right) + \mathbf{L}_\varepsilon^P \hat{\mathbf{C}}_t + \mathbf{L}_\tau^P \hat{\tau}_t}_{\text{Real Marginal Cost}} \right] + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}^P$$

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Risk Sharing
$$- \mathbf{Z} \underbrace{(\Gamma \hat{\mathbf{P}}_t^P + \mathbf{L}_\varepsilon^C \hat{\mathbf{C}}_t + \mathbf{L}_\tau^C \hat{\tau}_t)} + \hat{\mathbf{C}}_t = \sigma \mathbf{Z} \hat{\mathbf{C}}_t + \mathbf{L}_\tau^Q \hat{\tau}_0$$

Risk Sharing Wedge Under Incomplete Markets

Flexible-Price One Good Example

- Closed-form responses of consumption and exchange rate:

$$\hat{C}_{H,t} = - \underbrace{\frac{\Omega(1-\gamma) + \gamma}{1 + \Omega}}_{>0} \left(\frac{1}{1 - \Omega} \hat{\tau}_t + \hat{w}_t \right)$$
$$\hat{\varepsilon}_t = - \underbrace{\frac{(\Omega(1-\gamma) + \gamma)}{1 + \Omega}}_{>0} \hat{\tau}_t + \underbrace{\frac{(1 - \Omega)(1 - 2\gamma)}{1 + \Omega}}_{>0} \hat{w}_t$$

- Tariffs generate persistent deviations from perfect risk-sharing. Wedge response:

$$\frac{\partial \hat{w}_{t+j}}{\partial \hat{\tau}_t} = - \frac{(1 - \beta)}{1 - \beta \rho^\tau} \frac{\gamma(1 - \Omega)(\theta - 1)^2 - \theta}{(1 + \Omega - 2\theta)(\Omega(2(1 - \gamma) + 1) - (1 - 2\gamma))} (1 + \Omega)$$

- Sign and magnitude depends on (γ, Ω, θ) :
 - $\hat{w}_t < 0$: wealth transfer to home country \Rightarrow appreciation, consumption gain.
 - More persistent tariffs \Rightarrow larger wedge \Rightarrow larger wealth transfer.