

# Real Effects of Corporate Debt Collateral Eligibility

Bo JING（经菠）

PBC School of Finance, Tsinghua University

Please contact me: Jingb.21@pbcsf.tsinghua.edu.cn



## Introduction


- ECB accepts corporate bonds as collateral since 1999
- Fed introduced similar facilities in March 2020
- ECB policy operates independently from QE programs

### Why *Corporate Bonds as Collateral*?

- Traditional policy relies on public debt (US, Japan, UK, China)
- Euro Area faces limited public debt supply
- ECB solution: Expand to corporate bonds

### Why Study the ECB?

- Longer time series: Policy in place since 1999
- Transparency: Published bond codes (ISINs)
- Clean identification: Separate from asset purchases




## Research Questions:

This paper investigates three questions:

- How does collateral eligibility affect a firm's own investment and employment?
- Do effects propagate through supply chain linkages?
- What do firms gain from acting as intermediaries?

## Policy Timeline & Data



### Data Sources

- ECB: Daily eligibility list
- FactSet: Supply chain data

## Main Results

|                             | Financing Behavior   |                      |                    |                     | Firm Operations    |                           |
|-----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------------|
|                             | (1)<br>Debt Issuance | (2)<br>Debt Cost     | (3)<br>SEO         | (4)<br>Bank Lending | (5)<br>Labor       | (6)<br>Capital Investment |
| Own_list                    | 0.108***<br>(3.587)  | -0.316**<br>(-2.291) | -0.005<br>(-0.240) | 0.067<br>(1.176)    | -0.012<br>(-0.498) | -0.038<br>(-1.083)        |
| Controls                    | Yes                  | Yes                  | Yes                | Yes                 | Yes                | Yes                       |
| Firm fixed effects          | Yes                  | Yes                  | Yes                | Yes                 | Yes                | Yes                       |
| Industry-year fixed effects | Yes                  | Yes                  | Yes                | Yes                 | Yes                | Yes                       |
| Country-year fixed effects  | Yes                  | Yes                  | Yes                | Yes                 | Yes                | Yes                       |
| Number of observations      | 26,668               | 26,087               | 27,225             | 13,315              | 21,589             | 27,282                    |
| R-squared                   | 0.78                 | 0.34                 | 0.96               | 0.88                | 0.97               | 0.97                      |

Inclusion in the EA eligible list significantly increases debt issuance by **10.8%** and reduces debt cost by **31.6** basis points, improving firms' access to financing.

### Mechanism: *Shadow Banking* via *Trade Credit*

Eligible firms do **NOT** increase their own investment. Instead:

- Issue bonds at **lower** costs
- Extend more **trade credit** to downstream
- Downstream firms increase investment

### Benefits to Eligible Firms:

- Stabilize supply chain relationships
- Capture higher markups
- Act as "**shadow banks**"


## Which Firms Provide More Trade Credit?

### Trade Credit Providers (Eligible Firms):

- Mature, large, cash-rich
- Low growth, low R&D
- Limited investment opportunities

### Trade Credit Recipients (Downstream):

- Young, small, cash-constrained
- High growth, high R&D
- Abundant investment opportunities



## Conclusions

1. Eligible firms do not increase own investment
2. Firms act as intermediaries, extending trade credit
3. Real effects propagate through supply chains
4. Strategic benefits: market power + relationship stability

**Policy Implication:** Central bank collateral policies affect the real economy through *production networks*, not just *direct channels*.