

Pension Reform and Asset Allocation: Evidence from Annuity Cuts to Retired Civil Servants in Taiwan

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Abstract

How do households reallocate assets when faced with a sudden decrease in lifetime income? We examine retired civil servants' asset allocation in response to a retroactive pension cut in Taiwan. Using administrative tax data, we show that these retirees increased their stock-to-wealth ratios by 10%, stock holdings by 7%, but not risk exposures to market following the annuity cuts. Moreover, they exhibited a heightened disposition effect, reduced their bank deposits and total wealth, and were more likely to re-enter the labor market. Our large-scale evidence suggests that, consistent with prospect theory, retirees pursued riskier assets under annuity cuts.

Introduction

- Research Question:** How do permanent income reductions caused by pension reform affect retirees' asset allocation decisions?
- Pension reforming is perhaps the most pressing economic issue in an aging society (Lindbeck and Persson, 2003; OECD, 2019, 2021, 2023).
- We employed an retroactive pension reform that cut pensions by approximately 30%-45% over a 10-year span.
- We use the administrative tax data that includes 6 type of assets: deposits, bonds, stocks, housing, land, and car ownership.
- The causal effects are identified by a Difference-in-Differences design.
- In comparison with households in the private sector, the households of retired civil servants revealed the following patterns:
 - stock-to-wealth ratio \uparrow by 10%; stock holdings \uparrow by 7%
 - the effect \uparrow with the number of children
 - disposition effect \uparrow
 - deposit-to-wealth ratio and wealth \downarrow by 22% and 3.67%
 - probability of finding post-retirement job \uparrow by 4 ppt
- We challenge prior literature on households' de-risking upon wealth loss/income reduction.**

Institutional Change

Table 1: Income Replacement Ratio (Annuity/Working Income before Retirement) Before and After the Pension Reform

Tenure	40	35	30	25	20	15
(A)	95%	95%	85%	75%	75%	75%
(B)	90%	90%	90%	85%	80%	75%
July, 2018	77.5%	75.0%	67.5%	60.0%	52.5%	45.0%
2029	62.5%	60%	52.5%	45%	37.5%	30%

- Two possible schemes pre-reform (A/B).
- Legislation passed in 2017.
- Pension cut starting from July 2018.
- Additional 1.5% decrease every year until 2029.

Empirical Specification

$$\text{AssetAllocation}_{it} = b \text{ CivilServant}_i \times \text{Post}_t + \mathbf{X}_{it}\Gamma + \mu_i + \delta_t \text{ or } \sigma_{ct} + \varepsilon_{it}.$$

- Household-year level panel data from 2013-2021.
- Identification Design: Difference-in-Differences.
- Control Variables: # of children ≤ 24 yrs old, $\ln(1 + \text{mortgage})$, and fixed effects for the husband's age.

Results




Figure 1: Logarithm of stock-to-wealth ratio in different years




Figure 2: Logarithm of stock holdings in different years

Testing Mechanism

A rational asset allocation adjustment?

- CRRA/DRRA: permanent income reduction \Rightarrow lower risky asset holdings as households aim to stabilize consumption.
- However, we found more stock holdings (i.e., risky assets) after annuity cut
- Retired civil servants increased their holdings in "safer stocks"; nevertheless, we do not find higher stock returns or betas.

Prospect Theory Interpretation:

- Individuals evaluate outcomes relative to a reference point and exhibit asymmetric risk preferences (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
- The pre-reform pension served as a salient reference point.
- The reform generated a perceived loss.
- In the loss domain, civil servants became risk-seeking.
- Psychologically appealing for the chance to "break even."
- We implement two tests to assess the role of perceived losses:
 - Whether the perceived loss is larger in households with **more children**.
 - Whether a **reference point** is present, using evidence from the **disposition effect**.

Table 2: Dividing the sample into subgroups by # of children. Table 3: Effect of Pension Reform on realized gains and losses (from stocks sold)

# Children	(1)			(2)			(3)					
	VARIABLES	In(Stock/Wealth)	In(Stock/Wealth)	In(Stock/Wealth)	VARIABLES	In(Stock/Wealth)	In(Stock/Wealth)	VARIABLES	In(Stock/Wealth)			
<i>Panel A: In(Stock/Wealth)</i>												
Civil Servant \times Post	0.0900*** (0.0126)	0.1467*** (0.0361)	0.1844*** (0.0657)	Child Dependency		0.0079 (0.0214)		Husband Age FE	-			
In(1+mortgage)	0.0216*** (0.0005)	0.0240*** (0.0014)	0.0225*** (0.0019)	Observations	636,962	110,062	52,882	Household FE	Y			
	(4)	(5)	(6)					Year FE	Y			
# Children	0	1	≥ 2	VARIABLES	In(Stock Holdings)	In(Stock Holdings)	In(Stock Holdings)	City-Year FE	-			
				Panel B: In(Stock Holdings)	Civil Servant \times Post	0.0760*** (0.0121)	0.1256*** (0.0351)	0.1260** (0.0621)	Observations	803,558	803,558	803,558
				Child Dependency		-0.0043 (0.0203)						
				In(1+mortgage)	-0.0005 (0.0005)	0.0003 (0.0013)	-0.0006 (0.0017)					
					Observations	639,881	110,561	53,116				

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