

# Supplemental Appendix

## Demand, Competition and Public Policy in the Automobile Industry

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### 1 Data sources

To estimate a discrete choice demand system on the automobile industry, three pieces of information are necessary: product characteristics, consumer choices or market shares, and a few pieces of aggregate information. We discuss them in turn and provide an overview in Table A.1.<sup>1</sup>

**Product characteristics** Every study that estimates the demand for passenger vehicles requires information on (car) model characteristics, including the Manufacturer Suggested Retail Price (MSRP). BLP obtained this information from the annual printed volumes of two trade press publications (*Automotive News Market Data Book*, *Ward's Automotive Yearbook*). For studies of the US market this remains the most popular source of information because it is inexpensive to obtain.

Early research on other countries, which tend not to be covered by the trade press, used information from a variety of consumer publications. In many countries, 'car magazines' aimed at the consumer market publish an annual catalog of vehicles for sale on their national market, see for example Verboven (1996). Some private publishers compile information on new and second-hand vehicle prices by model that also contain information on a limited number of model characteristics, such as the *Kelly Blue Book* (United States) or the *Yitzhak Levi pricebook* (Israel) used in Fershtman and Gandal (1998).

More recent studies often use more detailed information for specific variants of each model. This information often comes from companies specialized in data collection and market research, or producing reports with insights on the automotive industry. Often, a very large range of vehicle characteristics can be provided, including segment classifications, dealer invoice price, fuel consumption, standard equipment (such as A/C or traction control), brand, firm ownership information, country of assembly, platform code, etc. The two most important companies that provide information to many researcher are *JATO Analytics* and *S&P Global Mobility*, which has taken over *Polk Automotive Solutions* as well as *IHS Markit*.

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<sup>1</sup>The original BLP data can be downloaded from [https://pyblp.readthedocs.io/en/stable/\\_notebooks/tutorial/blp.html](https://pyblp.readthedocs.io/en/stable/_notebooks/tutorial/blp.html) as part of the PyBLP tutorial of Conlon and Gortmaker (2020). The micro-moments tutorial on the same site provides a link to download the data used in Petrin (2002). Comparable information (to BLP) for the automobile markets in five EU countries can be found at: <https://sites.google.com/site/frankverbo/data-and-software/data-set-on-the-european-car-market>.

Table A.1: Overview of commonly used data sources

| Variables                                         | Data  | Sources                                                                        | Examples                                                                                                                                                                      |
|---------------------------------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| (a) Product characteristics                       |       |                                                                                |                                                                                                                                                                               |
| - Size, market segment,<br>engine power, MSRP,... | 1,2,3 | Trade press publications<br>Consumer publications<br>Market research companies | <i>Automotive News</i> , <i>Ward's Automotive Yearbook</i><br><i>Katalog Der Automobil Review</i> , <i>Autogids</i><br><i>S&amp;P Global Mobility</i> , <i>Jato Analytics</i> |
| - Transaction prices                              | 2     | Market research companies<br>Administrative data                               | Undisclosed (Albuquerque and Bronnenberg, 2012)<br>Texas DMV (Sagl, 2024)                                                                                                     |
| (b) Purchases / registrations                     |       |                                                                                |                                                                                                                                                                               |
| - Product-level sales<br>or market share          | 1,3   | Trade press publications<br>Market research companies<br>Administrative data   | <i>Automotive News</i> , <i>Ward's Automotive Yearbook</i><br><i>S&amp;P Global Mobility</i> , <i>Jato Analytics</i><br>National vehicle registration databases               |
| - Individual choices                              | 2,3   | National consumption survey<br>Administrative data<br>Company-run surveys      | Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX)<br>Vehicle registrations by ZIP code<br>MRI's Survey of the American Consumer<br>(Grieco et al., 2024)                                      |
| - Second-choice information                       | 2,3   | Consumer surveys                                                               | CAMIP survey for GM (Berry et al., 2004)                                                                                                                                      |
| (c) Aggregate information                         |       |                                                                                |                                                                                                                                                                               |
|                                                   | 1,2,3 | Official statistics                                                            | Number of households<br>Income distribution                                                                                                                                   |

*Notes:* The column “Data” indicates the type of study, with the numeric values referring to: 1 = aggregate, 2 = micro, 3 = combined.

Depending on a study’s focus, other information is sometimes collected from specialized sources. Vehicle reliability, which is used, for example, in Goldberg (1995), is not available in standard sources, but published for all models for sale on the US market by the consumer magazine *Consumer Reports* or the consulting company *J.D. Power* based on consumer surveys. Similar information for models in operation in Germany is published by the roadside assistance company *ADAC*.

Most studies rely on the MSRP as a price measure. Although this overestimates the actual transaction price due to discounting practices, some studies discuss why it does not necessarily generate biased estimates of price elasticities. Appropriate fixed effects would account for time-invariant country-specific or brand-specific discounting practices, whereas the unobserved demand error term may be interpreted to include remaining measurement error for price. A few studies use transaction-specific prices. Chandra et al. (2017) use data from a market research firm, which in turn obtained it from automobile dealers, to perform a reduced-form analysis. Albuquerque and Bronnenberg (2012) obtained transaction-level information from a market research firm covering 20% of all transactions in the San Diego area between 2004 and 2006. Sagl (2024) uses comparable information on almost 1.5 million individual transactions in Texas between 2011 and 2019, obtained from registrations at the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles. The last two studies use the infor-

mation to estimate an individual choice model. Although such transaction-level prices may seem to be an appealing alternative to MSRP, their use in demand estimation also requires additional assumptions because they are by definition not observed for the non-chosen models. One typical approach assumes that all consumers can purchase at the average transaction price observed in the data set.

**Purchases or registrations** Empirical studies of demand have used either aggregate sales data, or individual purchase data, or a combination of both.

First consider aggregate, product-level sales data. BLP construct product-level market shares as the fraction of sales in the potential market size (including the outside good). Sales per product is available for multiple years and/or countries, and comes from the two data sources that also provide information on model characteristics. Early studies usually define the product quite broadly as the car model because they rely on information from trade press publications in a printed format, where the level of detail tends to be limited. For example, for most cars, SUVs and minivans the unit of analysis is the so-called “nameplate”, for instance, Toyota Camry or Ford Explorer. More recent studies that use information from market research companies often have access to vehicle sales data for variants of models that are defined at much greater detail. Variants can be distinguished by their engine size (displacement categories), fuel type (gasoline, diesel, electric), body type (sedan, station wagon, convertible), transmission (automatic, manual), drive train (FWD, AWD, 4x4), version (luxury level of trim & options, classification varies by company). Often, vehicle sales is available by month, rather than year.

In some countries, including the United States, the aggregate sales information is obtained from the manufacturers, but in many other countries, including most EU countries, the information is aggregated from administrative registrations obtained from governments. Increasingly, researchers are also able to access this administrative data directly from various governments, without having to go through middlemen. That type of information is often available for smaller geographical areas (states or postal codes) and the analysis can pool over multiple markets. For example, the province-level analysis for China in Barwick et al. (2021) uses vehicle registration information from the State Administration of Industry and Commerce. For some countries, including the case of China studied in Hu et al. (2014), this information is available from the national association of automobile manufacturers, which generally belong to the International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers (OICA).

Next, consider data on individual vehicle purchases rather than aggregate market shares. Such data may sometimes come from the above-mentioned administrative records collected by governments. A main advantage of such individual registration data is that they cover the universe of transactions. The limitation is that they typically include only a narrow set of demographic variables (postal code, gender, age), and these are not available in combination. Alternatively,

individual-level information may come from surveys which cover a (representative) sample of consumers. The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) of the United States is a popular example, see for example Goldberg (1995). Similarly, researchers rely on propriety surveys by market research firms or organized by the OEMs themselves.

Studies that add information on second choices to help identify cross-product substitution patterns, for example, Berry et al. (2004) and Grieco et al. (2024), invariably rely on consumer surveys with such stated second choices. Naturally, this type of information is of interest to car manufacturers and market research data firms organize such surveys.

Studies that combine aggregate data with individual data (referred to as data type 3 in Table A.1) do not necessarily require access to the entire data set of individual choice purchases. It is sufficient to have access to relevant micro-moments of this data set, which may sometimes even be reported in public documents. Micro-moments include the average value of consumer characteristics conditional on a certain purchase decision, or sales or market shares conditional on certain consumer characteristics. For example, in his study of the impact of the minivan Petrin (2002) relies on the average household size by market segment (such as the minivan), without requiring full access to the survey data. Conversely, when studying the value of dealer proximity, Nurski and Verboven (2016) make use of market shares conditional on consumer locations (postal codes).

**Aggregate information** Finally, in order to estimate a demand model, one needs aggregate information on the total potential market size taken from official government statistics, which is often approximated by the total number of households. Many studies impose heterogeneity on the price sensitivity that varies with income, as indicated in Table A.2. The model is estimated by drawing simulated consumers from the empirical income distribution.<sup>2</sup> The observed distribution of annual mileage driven can be used similarly to allow for heterogeneity in the preference for fuel efficiency.

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<sup>2</sup>Naturally, many other sources than government statistics can be used to infer the relevant income distribution. For example, Barwick et al. (2021) uses annual surveys conducted by the Ford Motor Company to obtain information on the conditional income distribution specifically of new car buyers.

## 2 Tables summarizing the covered literature

Table A.2: Car demand studies: instruments and covered heterogeneity

| Authors              | Year | Data | Spec. | Price                     | Power | Size | Fuel | Other | Fixed Effects | IVs             |
|----------------------|------|------|-------|---------------------------|-------|------|------|-------|---------------|-----------------|
| Hashmi & Van Biese.  | 2016 | 1    | L     | no                        |       |      |      |       |               | BLP             |
| Li, Tong, Xing, Zhou | 2017 | 1    | L     | no                        |       |      |      |       | model*mkt     | incl. FE        |
| Verboven             | 1996 | 1    | NL    | no                        |       | 1    |      | 1     | origin        | BLP             |
| Fershtman & Gandal   | 1998 | 1    | NL    | no                        |       | 1    |      |       |               | BLP+cost        |
| Fershtman et al.     | 1999 | 1    | NL    | no                        |       | 1    |      |       |               | BLP+cost        |
| Goldberg & Verboven  | 2001 | 1    | NL    | $\alpha/y_i$              |       | 1    |      | 1     | origin*ctry   | BLP+cost        |
| Brenkers & Verboven  | 2006 | 1    | NL    | $\alpha/y_i$              |       | 5+   |      | 1     | model         | BLP             |
| Moral & Jaumandreu   | 2007 | 1    | NL    | no                        |       | 1    |      |       |               | other           |
| Tovar                | 2012 | 1    | BST   | no                        |       | 1    |      | 1     | firm          | BLP+cost        |
| Adamou et al.        | 2014 | 1    | NL    | no                        |       | 1    |      | 1     |               | BLP             |
| Park & Rhee          | 2014 | 1    | NL    | no                        |       |      |      |       | brand         | BLP+tax         |
| Blonigen et al.      | 2017 | 1    | NL    | no                        |       | 1    |      |       | segment       | BLP             |
| Durrmeyer & Samano   | 2018 | 1    | NL    | no                        |       | 1    |      |       | firm          | BLP             |
| Zhou & Li            | 2018 | 1    | NL    | no                        |       |      |      | 1     | model*mkt     | other           |
| Hu, Yin & Zhao       | 2023 | 1    | NL    | no                        |       |      |      | 1     | brand*mkt     | BLP+cost        |
| Grigolon             | 2021 | 1    | ONL   | $\alpha/y_i$              |       | 5+   |      |       | model         | BLP+cost        |
| BLP                  | 1995 | 1    | RCL   | $\alpha/y_i$              | 1     | 1    | 1    | 1     |               | BLP             |
| Berry et al.         | 1999 | 1    | RCL   | $\alpha/y_i$              |       | 1    | 1    |       |               | BLP             |
| Sudhir               | 2001 | 1    | RCL   | no                        | 1     | 1    |      |       | origin        | BLP             |
| Kitano & Ohashi      | 2009 | 1    | RCL   | $\alpha/y_i$              | 1     |      |      | 1     |               | BLP+cost        |
| Grigolon & Verboven  | 2014 | 1    | RCL   | $\alpha/y_i$              | 1     | 2    | 1    |       | model         | BLP             |
| Hu, Xiao & Zhou      | 2014 | 1    | RCL   | $\sigma^\alpha$           |       |      |      |       | origin        | BLP+cost        |
| Huse & Lucinda       | 2014 | 1    | RCL   | $\sigma^\alpha$           |       |      |      |       | brand         | BLP             |
| Reynaert & Verboven  | 2014 | 1    | RCL   | $\sigma^\alpha$           | 1     | 1    |      |       | model         | BLP+cost        |
| Guajardo et al.      | 2016 | 1    | RCL   | $\sigma^\alpha$           | 1     | 1    | 1    |       | brand         | BLP             |
| Ohashi & Toyoma      | 2017 | 1    | RCL   | $\alpha/y_i$              | 1     |      |      |       |               | BLP             |
| Cosar et al.         | 2018 | 1    | RCL   | $\alpha_h$                | 1     |      | 1    |       | brand*mkt     | BLP+cost        |
| Grigolon et al.      | 2018 | 1    | RCL   | $\alpha/y_i$              | 1     | 1    |      |       | model         | BLP+cost        |
| Miravete et al.      | 2018 | 1    | RCL   | $\alpha/y_i$              | 1     | 1    | 1    |       | brand         | BLP             |
| Reynaert             | 2021 | 1    | RCL   | $\alpha/y_i$              |       |      | 1    | 1     | model         | BLP+cost        |
| Shen et al.          | 2021 | 1    | RCL   | $\alpha/y_i$              | 1     | 1    | 1    |       | origin        | BLP             |
| Springel             | 2021 | 1    | RCL   | $\sigma^\alpha$           |       |      |      |       | model         | BLP+cost        |
| Guo & Xiao           | 2023 | 1    | RCL   | $\alpha_h, \sigma^\alpha$ | 1     |      | 1    | 1     | brand         | BLP             |
| Ale-Chilet et al.    | 2025 | 1    | RCL   | $\sigma^\alpha$           |       |      |      | 1     | model*body    | BLP+cost        |
| Remmy                | 2025 | 1    | RCL   | $\alpha/y_i$              |       |      | 1    | 1     | firm          | differentiation |
| Goldberg             | 1995 | 2    | NL    | $\alpha_h$                |       |      |      | 5+    | brand         | FE              |
| Goldberg             | 1998 | 2    | NL    | $\alpha_h$                |       |      |      | 5+    | brand         | FE              |
| Bachman et al.       | 2023 | 2    | NL    | $\alpha_h$                |       | 3    |      | 1     |               | BLP             |
| Train & Winston      | 2007 | 2    | RCL   | $\alpha_h, \sigma^\alpha$ | 1     |      | 1    | 5+    | brand         | BLP             |
| Langer               | 2011 | 2    | RCL   | $\alpha_h, \sigma^\alpha$ | 1     |      | 2    | 5+    | model         | BLP             |
| Albuquerque & Bronn. | 2012 | 2    | RCL   | $\alpha_h$                |       | 1    |      | 1     |               | BLP             |
| Thomassen            | 2017 | 2    | RCL   | $\alpha_h$                | 3     | 1    | 3    | 5+    | model         | FE              |
| Murry & Zhou         | 2020 | 2    | RCL   | $\alpha_h, \sigma^\alpha$ |       | 1    | 1    | 5+    |               | BLP             |
| Huse & Koptuyug      | 2022 | 2    | RCL   | no                        |       |      | 1    |       | model         | FE              |
| Sagl                 | 2024 | 2    | RCL   | $\alpha_h, \sigma^\alpha$ |       | 1    | 1    | 5+    | model*trim    | FE              |

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| Authors                | Year | Data | Spec. | Price                     | Power | Size | Fuel | Other | Fixed Effects | IVs        |
|------------------------|------|------|-------|---------------------------|-------|------|------|-------|---------------|------------|
| Petrin                 | 2002 | 3    | RCL   | $\alpha_h$                | 1     |      | 1    | 5+    |               | BLP        |
| Berry et al.           | 2004 | 3    | RCL   | $\alpha_h, \sigma^\alpha$ | 3     |      | 1    | 5+    | brand         | BLP        |
| Beresteanu & Li        | 2011 | 3    | RCL   | $\alpha_h$                | 1     | 5    | 1    | 4     | product       | BLP        |
| Schiraldi              | 2011 | 3    | RCL   | $\alpha/y_i$              |       |      |      | 1     |               | other      |
| Li, Xiao & Liu         | 2015 | 3    | RCL   | $\alpha_h, \sigma^\alpha$ | 1     | 1    | 1    |       | firm          | BLP+cost   |
| Nurski & Verboven      | 2016 | 3    | RCL   | $\alpha_h, \sigma^\alpha$ | 1     | 3    | 3    | 3     | origin        | BLP        |
| Murry                  | 2017 | 3    | RCL   | $\alpha_h, \sigma^\alpha$ |       |      |      | 4     | brand         | BLP        |
| Li                     | 2018 | 3    | RCL   | $\sigma^\alpha$           | 1     |      |      | 1     | model         | FE         |
| Wollmann               | 2018 | 3    | RCL   | no                        |       |      |      | 5+    |               | BLP+cost   |
| D'Haultfœuille et al.  | 2019 | 3    | RCL   | $\alpha_h, \sigma^\alpha$ | 2     | 2    |      | 5+    | brand         | BLP+cost   |
| Barwick, Cao & Li      | 2021 | 3    | RCL   | $\sigma^\alpha$           |       |      | 1    | 1     |               | BLP+cost   |
| Durrmeyer              | 2022 | 3    | RCL   | $\alpha_h, \sigma^\alpha$ | 1     | 1    | 2    | 1     | brand         | BLP        |
| Moraga et al.          | 2023 | 3    | RCL   | $\alpha_h$                | 2     |      |      | 5+    |               | cost       |
| Wang & Xing            | 2023 | 3    | RCL   | $\alpha_h, \sigma^\alpha$ |       |      | 1    | 2     | firm*year     | subs.+cost |
| Barwick, Kwon & Li     | 2024 | 3    | RCL   | $\alpha_h, \sigma^\alpha$ |       |      |      | 2     | br*eng*mkt    | cost       |
| Grieco et al.          | 2024 | 3    | RCL   | $\alpha_h$                | 1     | 4    | 1    | 5+    | brand         | cost       |
| Heid, Remmy & Reynaert | 2024 | 3    | RCL   | $\alpha^\alpha$           |       |      | 3    |       | firm          |            |

**Notes:** This table provides background information for Table 1 and Table 2 in the main text. Studies are sorted by the entries in columns Data-Spec.-Year-Authors (in that order). The values in the column “Data” refers to: 1 = aggregate, 2 = micro, 3 = combined. The column “price” indicates how heterogeneity for price is incorporated: not (no), through empirical income distribution ( $\alpha/y_i$ ), through demographic interactions ( $\alpha_h$ ), or through the standard deviation of the random coefficient ( $\sigma^\alpha$ ). The columns “power”, “size”, “fuel”, and “other” indicate how many heterogeneity coefficients for these characteristics are statistically significant; nested logit parameters enter under “size” if nests are segments, and under “other” if nests refer to country of origin or fuel engine type. The column “IVs” indicates the instruments used to account for price endogeneity: BLP (traditional or variants); cost (exchange rate, input\*characteristic interactions); or other (for example lagged prices). The column “fixed effects” refers to brand, brand\*market interaction, model, or model\*market interactions (empty cells imply either no or higher level interactions such as firm or segment).

Table A.3: Other studies on the automotive industry

| Authors              | Year | Data | Section     | Method         | Dep.Var.      | Note                                      |
|----------------------|------|------|-------------|----------------|---------------|-------------------------------------------|
| Bresnahan            | 1981 | 1    | Supply side | vertical diff. | $q$           | one-dimensional heterogeneity, no $\xi_j$ |
| Mertens & Ginsburgh  | 1985 | 1    | Supply side | reduced-form   | $p$           | hedonic price regression                  |
| Verboven             | 2002 | 1    | Supply side | engine demand  | $q, p$        | differenced-out product demand            |
| Knittel              | 2011 | 1    | Supply side | reduced-form   | $X$           | MC curve trading off characteristics      |
| Goldberg             | 1996 | 2    | Supply side | reduced-form   | $p$           | dealer discount                           |
| Scott Morton et al.  | 2003 | 2    | Supply side | reduced-form   | $p$           | compares offline & online markets         |
| Anderson et al.      | 2015 | 2    | Supply side | reduced-form   | $X$           | choice of brand                           |
| Chandra et al.       | 2017 | 2    | Supply side | reduced-form   | $p$           | compares margins within model-trim        |
| Bresnahan            | 1987 | 1    | Competition | vertical diff. | $q$           | one-dimensional heterogeneity, no $\xi_j$ |
| Bertomeu et al.      | 2021 | 1    | Competition | reduced-form   | $q^{future}$  | features of production forecasts          |
| Feenstra & Levinsohn | 1995 | 1    | Trade       | vertical diff. | $p$           | multi-dimensional heterog., no $\xi_j$    |
| Head & Mayer         | 2019 | 1    | Trade       | CES demand     | $q$           | prod. location & market entry choices     |
| Chen et al.          | 2021 | 1    | Trade       | reduced-form   | $q$           | subsidy as explanatory variable           |
| Sun et al.           | 2021 | 1    | Trade       | reduced-form   | $q$           | logit, but price absorbed by FE           |
| Klier & Linn         | 2010 | 1    | Environment | reduced-form   | $q$           | gasoline price as explanatory variable    |
| Li, Linn & Spiller   | 2013 | 1    | Environment | diff-in-diff   | $q$           | Canada as control                         |
| Allcott & Wozny      | 2014 | 1    | Environment | reduced-form   | $p$           | logit, $\ln(s_j/s_0)$ included in $\xi_j$ |
| Jacobsen & van Bent. | 2015 | 1    | Environment | reduced-form   | $p, scrap$    | gasoline price as instrument for $p$      |
| Klier & Linn         | 2015 | 1    | Environment | reduced-form   | $q$           | vehicle tax as explanatory variable       |
| Busse et al.         | 2013 | 2    | Environment | reduced-form   | $q, p$        | new and second-hand cars                  |
| Grigolon et al.      | 2024 | 2    | Environment | reduced-form   | $usage$       | mileage and fueling choices               |
| Bento et al.         | 2009 | 3    | Environment | dynamic model  | $q, scrap$    | replacement by new or second-hand         |
| Jacobsen             | 2013 | 3    | Environment | dynamic model  | $q, p, scrap$ | adds supply side to Bento et al. (2009)   |
| Gillingham et al.    | 2021 |      | Environment | reduced-form   | $p$           | natural experiment on fuel eff. report    |
| Esteban & Shum       | 2007 | 1    | Conclusions | dynamic model  | $p$           | inverse demand; linear-quadratic          |
| Gillingham et al.    | 2022 | 1    | Conclusions | dynamic model  | $q, p, scrap$ | new and second-hand cars                  |
| Attanasio            | 2000 | 2    | Conclusions | dynamic model  | $q$           | car inventory demand                      |
| Busse et al.         | 2006 | 2    | Conclusions | diff-in-diff   | $p$           | pass-through of discounts by dealer       |
| Gavazza et al.       | 2014 | 2    | Conclusions | dynamic model  | $q, p$        | second-hand car market                    |
| Bertolotti et al.    | 2023 | 3    | Conclusions | dynamic model  | $pq, p, X$    | expenditures and quality upgrading        |

*Notes:* This table contains papers that are relevant for the three policy questions we study, but do not use a BLP demand model. Studies are sorted by the entries in columns Section-Data-Year-Authors (in that order). The column “Data” refers to: 1 = aggregate, 2 = micro, 3 = combined. The column “Dep.Var.” refers to:  $q$  = quantity or market share,  $p$  = price,  $scrap$  = scrappage rate,  $X$  = other product characteristics.

Table A.4: Own-price elasticities and markups in BLP demand studies

| Author              | Year | Data | Spec. | Elasticity |                |                     | Markup |              |                        |
|---------------------|------|------|-------|------------|----------------|---------------------|--------|--------------|------------------------|
|                     |      |      |       | Avg.       | Range          | Range of:           | Avg.   | Range        | Range of:              |
| Goldberg            | 1995 | 1    | NL    |            | [-1.1, -5.2]   | segment avgs        |        | [15.1, 69.0] | segment*origin avgs    |
| Langer              | 2011 | 1    | NL    |            | [-6.4, -17.8]  | 4 demogr. groups    |        | [25.6, 35.3] | 4 demogr. groups       |
| Hu, Xiao & Zhou     | 2014 | 1    | RCL   | -3.0       | [-2.8, -3.2]   | 25-75 pctiles       | 34.8   |              | (Bertrand conduct)     |
| Murry & Zhou        | 2020 | 1    | RCL   | -4.1       | [-1.4, -10.7]  | all products        | 29     |              |                        |
| Sagl                | 2024 | 1    | RCL   | -7.3       |                |                     | 21     |              |                        |
| Verboven            | 1996 | 2    | NL    |            | [-5.0, -15.0]  | sel. products       |        | [8.1, 19.9]  | segment avgs           |
| Goldberg & Verboven | 2001 | 2    | NL    |            | [-3.6, -6.5]   | country*origin avgs |        | [16.0, 40.0] | country*origin avgs    |
| Brenkers & Verboven | 2006 | 2    | NL    | -7.6       | [-10.9, -4.5]  | segment avgs        |        | [16.0, 24.0] | country avgs           |
| Durrmeyer & Samano  | 2018 | 2    | NL    | -3.2, -2.5 |                |                     | 29, 42 |              |                        |
| Hu, Yin & Zhao      | 2023 | 2    | NL    | -11.8      |                |                     | 19     | [11.3, 28.0] | overall range          |
| BLP                 | 1995 | 2    | RCL   |            | [-3.1, -6.8]   | 13 sel. products    |        | [15.9, 32.8] | 13 sel. products       |
| Ohashi & Toyoma     | 2017 | 2    | RCL   |            | [-1.6, -7.2]   | segment avgs        |        | [35.0, 65.0] | segment avgs           |
| Miravete et al.     | 2018 | 2    | RCL   |            | [-2.5, -3.9]   | segment avgs        |        | [44.3, 28.7] | segment avgs           |
| Cosar et al.        | 2018 | 2    | RCL   |            | [-14.1, -15.7] | 5 sel. products     |        | [6.0, 12.4]  | firm*country avgs      |
| Alé-Chilet et al.   | 2021 | 2    | RCL   | -3.3       |                |                     | 33     |              |                        |
| Shen et al.         | 2021 | 2    | RCL   |            | [-3.5, -8.1]   | 8 sel. products     |        | [15.2, 22.5] | avg imported, domestic |
| Beresteanu & Li     | 2011 | 3    | RCL   | -8.4       | [-3.7, -11]    | 11 sel. products    | 17.7   | [15.7, 38.6] | 11 sel. products       |
| Li, Xiao & Liu      | 2015 | 3    | RCL   |            | [-3.1, -4.5]   | sel. products       |        | [22.3, 32.4] | sel. products          |
| Nurski & Verboven   | 2016 | 3    | RCL   | -3.1       | [-1.5, -5.0]   | 10-90pctiles        | 43     | [21.0, 70.0] | 10-90pctiles           |
| Murry               | 2017 | 3    | RCL   | -4.9       | [-4.4, -6.2]   | sel. products       | 20     | [15, 22]     | dealer avgs            |
| DDF                 | 2019 | 3    | RCL   | -5.6       | [-3.9, -6.2]   | avg by demo group   | 20.6   | [17.5, 28.5] | avg by demo group      |
| Moraga et al.       | 2023 | 3    | RCL   | -5.7       | [-4.4, -6.7]   | 9 sel. products     | 32.2   | [15.9, 23.9] | 9 sel. products        |
| Grieco et al.       | 2024 | 3    | RCL   | -5.1       | [-4.2, -5.8]   | annual avgs         |        | [18.5, 32.5] | median 2018 vs 1980    |

*Notes:* This table reports average and ranges of own-price elasticities and percentage markups, as reported in various BLP demand studies. Only studies that report information on both elasticities and markups are retained. Studies are sorted by the entries in columns Data-Year-Authors (in that order). The two numbers in Durrmeyer and Samano (2018) refer to France and the United States. The numbers in Alé-Chilet et al. (2025) refer to median instead of average.

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