Mission Motivation and Public Sector Performance: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan Muhammad Yasir Khan Online Appendix

Figure A1: Timeline




Figure A2: Design of the Experiment




Table A1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	$\overline{\mathbf{N}}$
# of Households in Community	155.97	34.913	68	232	710
Years of Schooling	10.034	2.405	5	18	707
Healthcare Certificate	0.38	0.486	0	1	707
Tenure in Years	15.299	5.458	1	27	575
Proportion of HHs visited	0.371	0.21	0	1	710
Proportion of HHs with Pregnant Women	0.26	0.17	0	0.9	710
Proportion of HHs with Children	0.397	0.221	0	0.9	710

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Table A2: Balance on Pre-Treatment Covariates

	Total HH Assigned	Pregnant Women	Children Under two	LHW Visit	Distance in mins	Years of Schooling	Health Diploma	Tenure in Years	PSM Score	Raven Score
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Mission	0.440 (1.193)	0.001 (0.016)	-0.015 (0.021)	-0.028 (0.022)	0.423 (0.522)	-0.229 (0.285)	0.036 (0.043)	-0.415 (0.746)	-0.016 (0.063)	-0.024 (0.022)
Mission-plus	-0.843 (1.405)	0.027 (0.020)	0.013 (0.028)	0.002 (0.028)	0.027 (0.592)	-0.431 (0.336)	0.062 (0.058)	-0.323 (0.903)	-0.046 (0.082)	-0.043 (0.029)
Financial Incentive	1.170 (1.470)	0.007 (0.021)	0.036 (0.029)	0.014 (0.025)	0.518 (0.560)	0.103 (0.362)	$0.100 \\ (0.054)$	-2.677 (0.932)	-0.070 (0.080)	-0.020 (0.027)
Placebo	-1.174 (1.258)	$0.009 \\ (0.018)$	0.012 (0.023)	-0.005 (0.023)	$0.193 \\ (0.515)$	-0.248 (0.307)	-0.001 (0.047)	-1.161 (0.779)	-0.092 (0.070)	-0.048 (0.023)
Control Mean # of Observations # of Workers	155.63 710 710	0.26 7099 710	0.40 7099 710	0.39 7099 710	15.96 7099 710	10.25 707 707	0.35 707 707	16.00 575 575	3.66 709 709	0.60 710 710

Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. This table reports balance across pre-treatment covariates mentioned in the column headers. Each regression includes block fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the worker level.

Table A3: Balance Table: Attrition in Datasets

	Endline Survey (1)	Post-Endline Survey (2)	Administrative Health Data (3)
Mission	0.007 (0.005)	$0.000 \\ (0.002)$	-0.008 (0.041)
Mission-plus	$0.000 \\ (0.003)$	$0.000 \\ (0.003)$	0.032 (0.049)
Financial Incentive	0.011 (0.011)	$0.011 \\ (0.011)$	$0.018 \\ (0.051)$
Placebo	0.010 (0.008)	0.011 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.043)
Control Mean # of Observations	0.00 710	0.00 710	0.25 710

Notes: p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.05. This table tests whether attrition in the endline survey, post-endline survey, and administrative health datasets is correlated with the treatments. Each column reports results from a regression that tests if the missingness is different between the treatments and control. Each regression includes block fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the worker level.

Table A4: Effects on the Probability of Household Visits: Unweighted Sample

Dep Var: Household Visit = 1		After the Experiment			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mission	0.048 (0.012) [0.001]	0.050 (0.020) [0.020]	0.052 (0.019) [0.013]	0.041 (0.018) $[0.026]$	0.051 (0.021) $[0.020]$
Mission-plus	0.069 (0.014) [0.001]	0.069 (0.026) [0.015]	0.054 (0.022) $[0.022]$	0.085 (0.022) $[0.001]$	$0.021 \\ (0.025) \\ [0.179]$
Financial Incentive	0.102 (0.015) [0.001]	0.086 (0.024) [0.001]	0.098 (0.024) [0.001]	$0.121 \\ (0.023) \\ [0.001]$	$0.029 \\ (0.025) \\ [0.120]$
Placebo	0.012 (0.012) $[0.152]$	0.009 (0.021) [0.243]	0.011 (0.020) [0.219]	0.016 (0.020) [0.179]	$0.015 \\ (0.022) \\ [0.193]$
Control Mean	0.360	0.383	0.372	0.326	0.298
# of Observations # of Workers	21299 710	7099 710	7100 710	7100 710	7100 710
Linear Combination	ons of Coe	efficients			
Mission — Placebo	0.036 [0.001]	0.041 [0.015]	0.042 [0.011]	0.024 [0.061]	0.036 [0.026]
Mission-plus — Placebo	0.057 [0.001]	0.060 $[0.015]$	0.043 $[0.024]$	0.068 [0.002]	0.006 [0.276]
Mission — Financial Incentive	-0.054 [0.001]	-0.037 [0.042]	-0.045 [0.024]	-0.080 [0.001]	0.022 [0.134]
Mission-plus — Financial Incentive	-0.033 [0.026]	-0.018 [0.193]	-0.044 [0.042]	-0.036 [0.072]	-0.008 [0.269]

Notes: This table reports the effects of the treatments on the probability of household visits using a linear probability model, without weighting the randomly selected sample using inverse probability of selection. The analysis uses household-level data collected across three survey rounds. Column 1 reports the results aggregated from all rounds, while columns 2–4 report regression results separately for each survey round. The first part of the table reports the coefficients on each treatment dummy. Each regression uses randomization-block fixed effects, and column 1 also uses survey-wave fixed effects. The second part of the table reports linear combinations of coefficients and tests them against a null of zero difference. The analysis uses responses from 21,299 surveys, instead of 21,300, due to one refusal that was not replaced by the field team. Standard errors are clustered at the worker level and reported in parentheses, and false discovery rate-adjusted q-values are reported in square brackets. Stars(*) represent significance using conventional p-values following the cutoff values of *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.

Table A5: Effects on the Probability of Household Visits: With Baseline Controls

Dep Var: Household Visit = 1		After the Experiment			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mission	0.061 (0.012) [0.001]	0.071 (0.010) [0.001]	0.053 (0.022) [0.018]	0.060 (0.022) [0.008]	$0.063 \\ (0.024) \\ [0.011]$
Mission-plus	0.068 (0.014) [0.001]	0.065 (0.013) [0.001]	0.046 (0.025) $[0.054]$	0.094 (0.026) [0.002]	-0.002 (0.029) [0.293]
Financial Incentive	0.102 (0.015) [0.001]	0.084 (0.013) [0.001]	0.085 (0.029) [0.005]	0.137 (0.028) [0.001]	0.023 (0.030) [0.210]
Placebo	0.016 (0.013) [0.117]	0.013 (0.012) [0.159]	0.014 (0.023) [0.231]	0.022 (0.023) [0.178]	0.011 (0.025) $[0.258]$
Control Mean	0.360	0.383	0.372	0.326	0.298
# of Observations # of Workers	17189 573	5729 573	5730 573	5730 573	5730 573
Linear Combinations of Coefficients	3				
Mission — Placebo	0.045 [0.001]	0.058 [0.001]	0.038 $[0.022]$	0.038 [0.022]	0.052 [0.005]
Mission-plus — Placebo	0.052 $[0.001]$	0.052 [0.001]	0.031 [0.088]	0.072 [0.004]	-0.012 [0.237]
Mission – Financial Incentive	-0.041 [0.003]	-0.013 [0.107]	-0.032 [0.107]	-0.077 [0.002]	0.040 [0.062]
Mission-plus — Financial Incentive	-0.034 [0.022]	-0.019 [0.081]	-0.039 [0.096]	-0.043 [0.079]	-0.024 [0.207]

Notes: This table reports the effects of the treatments on the probability of household visits using a linear probability model and controlling for baseline the covariates used to test the randomization balance. The analysis uses household-level data collected across three survey rounds. Column 1 reports the results aggregated from all rounds, while columns 2–4 report regression results separately for each survey round. The first part of the table reports the coefficients on each treatment dummy. Each regression uses randomization-block fixed effects, and column 1 also uses survey-wave fixed effects. The second part of the table reports linear combinations of coefficients and tests them against a null of zero difference. The analysis uses responses from 21,299 surveys, instead of 21,300, due to one refusal that was not replaced by the field team. Standard errors are clustered at the worker level and reported in parentheses, and false discovery rate-adjusted q-values are reported in square brackets. Stars(*) represent significance using conventional p-values following the cutoff values of *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.

Table A6: Robustness of Results by Sample Trimming

Dep Var: Household Visit = 1	Exclude Sample by						
	Size of the C	•	Size of th				
	Above 95th	Below 5th	Above 95th	Below 5th			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
Mission	0.046	0.052	0.052	0.047			
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)			
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]			
Mission-plus	0.069	0.070	0.071	0.068			
	(0.015) $[0.001]$	(0.015) $[0.001]$	(0.014) $[0.001]$	(0.014) $[0.001]$			
Financial Incentive	0.095	0.100	0.101	0.097			
rmanciai incentive	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.097)			
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]			
Placebo	0.012	0.013	0.014	0.012			
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)			
	[0.074]	[0.067]	[0.067]	[0.068]			
# of Observations	20279	20249	20279	20759			
# of Workers	676	675	676	692			
Linear Combinations of Coefficients	3						
Mission – Placebo	0.035	0.039	0.038	0.035			
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]			
Mission-plus — Placebo	0.057	0.057	0.057	0.056			
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]			
Mission — Financial Incentive	-0.049	-0.048	-0.049	-0.050			
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]			
Mission-plus — Financial Incentive	-0.026	-0.030	-0.030	-0.029			
	[0.026]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.018]			

Notes: This table reports the robustness of the results after trimming the sample to exclude workers who are above the 95th percentile or below the 5th percentile, based on the size of the community and the size of the randomization block/strata. Columns 1 and 2 report results after excluding the LHWs that serve communities larger than the 95th percentile and those below the 5th percentile, respectively. Similarly, columns 3 and 4 trim the sample based on the size of the randomization block. The regressions use the exact same specification as in column 1 of Table ??. Each regression uses block and survey-wave fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the worker level. False discovery rate-adjusted q-values are reported in square brackets. Stars(*) represent significance using conventional p-values following the cutoff values of *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.

Table A7: Heterogeneity by Baseline Worker Characteristics

	Heterogeneity by						
Dep. var: Household $Visit = 1$	Health	Years of	Tenure	Public Service	Raven's		
•	Diploma	Schooling		Motivation	Score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)		
Mission	0.050	0.051	0.057	0.049	0.051		
	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)		
	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]		
Mission-plus	0.063	0.069	0.073	0.070	0.070		
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.014)		
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]		
Financial Incentive	0.106	0.101	0.109	0.100	0.099		
	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)		
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]		
Placebo	0.009	0.013	0.021	0.012	0.013		
	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)		
	[0.687]	[0.382]	[0.217]	[0.418]	[0.382]		
Interaction Variable	0.009	0.013	0.021	0.012	0.013		
	(0.022)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.012)		
	[0.730]	[0.769]	[0.230]	[0.142]	[0.783]		
\times Mission	0.004	0.002	0.023	0.020	-0.006		
	(0.025)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.013)		
	[0.767]	[0.767]	[0.143]	[0.131]	[0.730]		
\times Mission-plus	0.015	-0.005	0.030	0.006	0.000		
	(0.030)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.016)		
	[0.730]	[0.730]	[0.131]	[0.730]	[0.844]		
× Financial Incentive	-0.009	0.004	0.013	0.003	0.025		
	(0.031)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)		
	[0.730]	[0.730]	[0.508]	[0.767]	[0.241]		
× Placebo	0.012	-0.006	0.032	0.017	0.004		
	(0.026)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.015)		
	[0.730]	[0.730]	[0.042]	[0.241]	[0.730]		
Control Mean	0.360	0.360	0.360	0.360	0.360		
# of Observations	21209	21209	17249	21269	21299		
# of Workers	707	707	575	709	710		

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity in performance effects by worker baseline characteristics, using household visits as the dependent variable. Each column presents results from the full regression, where the baseline characteristic specified in the column header is interacted with all treatment conditions. Each regression uses block and survey-wave fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the worker level. False discovery rate-adjusted q-values are reported in square brackets. Stars(*) represent significance using conventional p-values following the cutoff values of *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.

Table A8: Lee Bounds on the Effects on Multiple Tasks

	$Antenatal \\ Check = 1$			hild $ation = 1$	Tuberculosis $Check = 1$		
Bounds	Lower	Upper	Lower	Upper	Lower	Upper	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Mission	0.048	0.071	0.027	0.066	0.025	0.161	
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.014)	
N	0.054	0.050	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.010	
Mission-plus	0.054	0.076	0.030	0.066	0.006	0.213	
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.014)	
Financial Incentive	-0.007	0.081	0.011	0.065	-0.064	0.209	
	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.014)	
Placebo	-0.042	0.055	0.010	0.028	0.005	0.036	
	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.017)	

Notes: This table reports upper and lower bounds on the effects of the treatments for multiple tasks performed during the household visit using Lee (2009) bounds. The outcomes are specified in column headers. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table A9: Robustness of the Multiple Task Index

	wrantiple rac	ok index
	Multiple 'I	Task Index Cond.
	(1)	(2)
Mission	$0.126 \\ (0.025) \\ [0.001]$	0.123 (0.048) [0.009]
Mission-plus	0.166 (0.031) [0.001]	0.122 (0.052) $[0.013]$
Financial Incentive	0.191 (0.032) $[0.001]$	0.014 (0.055) $[0.270]$
Placebo	0.019 (0.026) $[0.158]$	-0.006 (0.053) [0.296]
Control Mean	0.000	-0.000
# of Observations # of Workers Block & Wave Fixed Effects Data Source	21299 710 ✓ HH Surveys	$\begin{array}{c} 8605 \\ 710 \\ \checkmark \\ \text{HH Surveys} \end{array}$
Linear Combinations of Coefficients	3	
Mission — Placebo	0.107 [0.001]	0.129 [0.001]
Mission-plus — Placebo	0.147 [0.001]	0.128 [0.002]
Mission — Financial Incentive	-0.065 [0.012]	0.109 [0.003]
Mission-plus — Financial Incentive	-0.025 [0.158]	0.108 [0.008]

Notes: This table checks the robustness of the effects on the multitasking index by using average standardized effects, following? for index construction. Each regression controls for randomization-block fixed effects and survey-wave fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the worker level and reported in parentheses. The second half of the table reports linear combinations of coefficients on the treatments and tests them against a null of zero difference. False discovery rate-adjusted q-values are reported in square brackets. Stars(*) represent significance using conventional p-values following the cutoff values of *p<0.1, **p<0.05, and ***p<0.01.

Table A10: Time-Use Analysis (Minutes)

	Length of Work Day	Mother & Child Visits	Other Visits	Non Visit Activities	Private Practice	Length of a Visit	Avg. Distance Traveled
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Mission	16.9 (5.9) [0.06]	11.6 (6.0) [0.24]	0.9 (5.8) [1.00]	8.2 (6.6) [0.56]	-2.7 (3.3) [0.75]	0.2 (0.5) [0.87]	2.0 (0.6) [0.03]
Mission-plus	15.1 (7.5) [0.24]	12.4 (7.6) [0.39]	-1.1 (8.1) [1.00]	7.5 (7.9) [0.68]	-0.5 (4.1) [1.00]	0.4 (0.7) [0.87]	1.5 (0.8) [0.24]
Financial Incentive	15.2 (8.0) [0.24]	-3.3 (7.3) [0.87]	11.4 (7.9) [0.44]	10.9 (8.3) [0.50]	-2.9 (4.1) [0.81]	0.7 (0.7) $[0.68]$	-0.1 (0.7) [1.00]
Placebo	4.1 (6.3) [0.86]	-5.3 (6.5) [0.75]	3.2 (6.6) [0.87]	$ \begin{array}{c} 10.0 \\ (7.4) \\ [0.49] \end{array} $	-5.1 (3.3) [0.39]	0.6 (0.6) [0.63]	0.4 (0.6) [0.86]
Control Mean # of Observations # of Workers Survey Source	318.4 705 705 Worker	154.8 705 705 Worker	139.4 705 705 Worker	20.5 705 705 Worker	10.4 705 705 Worker	18.5 5626 704 HH 2 & 3	15.9 2978 699 HH 1
Linear Combinations of Coefficients	3						
Mission — Placebo	12.7 [0.12]	16.9 [0.03]	-2.4 [0.87]	-1.8 [0.92]	2.4 [0.62]	-0.4 [0.68]	1.6 [0.06]
Mission-plus — Placebo	11.0 [0.39]	17.7 [0.09]	-4.3 [0.87]	-2.5 [0.92]	$4.6 \\ [0.47]$	-0.3 [0.87]	$1.1 \\ [0.44]$
Mission — Financial Incentive	1.6 [1.00]	14.9 [0.12]	-10.5 [0.39]	-2.7 [0.87]	$0.2 \\ [1.00]$	-0.4 [0.75]	$2.2 \\ [0.02]$
Mission-plus — Financial Incentive	-0.1 [1.00]	15.7 [0.24]	-12.5 [0.44]	-3.4 [0.87]	2.4 [0.87]	-0.3 [0.87]	1.6 [0.21]

Notes: This table explores if the treatments affect workers' time use in a typical day. Columns 1–5 use data from workers' self-reported time-use survey, and columns 6 and 7 use household survey data. The outcome variables are specified in the column headers, and all the results are reported in minutes. "Length of Work Day" measures the time between when workers start and end their work. "Mother & Child Visits" records time spent during visits to households with pregnant women, new mothers, or children aged two years or younger. "Other Visits" includes time spent during visits to all other types of households. "Non-Visit Activities" measures time spent on activities such as planning, updating records, collecting material from facilities, and meetings. "Private Practice" refers to time spent providing paid services, and "Length of visit" is the reported duration a worker stays in a household during a visit. "Avg. Distance Traveled" is the length of time it takes for the worker to travel to the households. Each regression controls for randomization-block fixed effects, and standard errors are reported in parentheses. Stars(*) represent significance using conventional p-values following the cutoff values of p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, and **p < 0.01.

Table A11: Effects of the Treatments on Additional Health Outcomes

	Mortali	$Mortality\ Rate$	
	Children	Mothers	Kg
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Mission	-0.003	-0.001	0.116
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.136)
	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]
Mission-plus	-0.001	-0.000	0.306
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.164)
	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]
Financial Incentive	-0.001	0.000	0.188
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.151)
	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]
Placebo	-0.001	-0.001	-0.026
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.144)
	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]
Control Mean	0.008	0.002	10.648
# of Observations	703	703	$2706 \\ 542$
# of Workers	703	703	
Linear Combinations of Coefficients	3		
Mission — Placebo	-0.001	0.000	0.142
	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]
Mission-plus — Placebo	0.000 [1.000]	0.001 [1.000]	0.331 [0.785]
Mission — Financial Incentive	-0.002	-0.001	-0.073
	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]
Mission-plus — Financial Incentive	-0.000 [1.000]	-0.001 [1.000]	0.117 [1.000]

Notes: This table reports the effects of the treatments on health outcomes specified in the column headers, using administrative data. Each regression controls for randomization-block fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the worker level and reported in parentheses. The second half of the table reports linear combinations of coefficients on the treatments and tests them against a null hypothesis of zero difference. False discovery rate-adjusted q-values are reported in square brackets. Stars(*) represent significance using conventional p-values following the cutoff values of *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.

Table A12: Beliefs About the Role of the Mission in the Organization

	Index of Beliefs	Importance	Mission Alignment	Attachment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mission	0.201 (0.071) [0.009]	$0.217 \\ (0.115) \\ [0.057]$	0.175 (0.105) [0.070]	0.216 (0.110) $[0.051]$
Mission-plus	$0.238 \\ (0.079) \\ [0.007]$	$0.254 \\ (0.128) \\ [0.051]$	0.219 (0.119) [0.057]	0.245 (0.119) $[0.044]$
Financial Incentive	-0.031 (0.090) [0.169]	0.046 (0.140) [0.169]	-0.161 (0.144) [0.118]	0.024 (0.141) $[0.194]$
Placebo	-0.146 (0.081) [0.059]	-0.093 (0.130) [0.139]	-0.304 (0.127) [0.021]	-0.043 (0.124) [0.169]
Control Mean	0.072	0.474	0.017	0.725
# of Observations # of Workers	$0.000 \\ 705$	-0.000 705	-0.000 705	-0.000 705
Linear Combinations of Coefficients	3			
Mission – Placebo	0.348 [0.001]	0.310 [0.004]	0.479 [0.001]	0.260 [0.007]
Mission-plus — Placebo	0.384 [0.001]	0.346 [0.004]	0.523 [0.001]	0.288 [0.007]
Mission — Financial Incentive	0.232 [0.004]	0.171 [0.070]	0.336 [0.008]	0.192 [0.063]
Mission-plus — Financial Incentive	0.269 [0.004]	0.208 [0.062]	0.380 [0.007]	0.221 [0.057]

Notes: This table reports the effects of the treatments on standardized beliefs regarding the organization's mission. Index of beliefs is a composite index of workers' agreement with three statements on a scale of 1 to 7: (1) importance, "I like the LHW program more than other departments because of the importance it places on the mission"; (2) alignment, "I believe the LHW program mission is very similar to my thinking since the beginning of 2019"; and (3) attachment, "If the LHW program mission was something else, I would not have been as attached to the program." The first half of the table reports the coefficients on each treatment. The regressions control for randomization-block fixed effects, and standard errors clustered at the worker level are reported in parentheses. The second part of the table reports linear combinations of coefficients and tests them against a null of zero difference. False discovery rate-adjusted q-values are reported in square brackets. Stars(*) represent significance using conventional p-values following the cutoff values of *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.




Figure A3: Perception of Workers About Being Monitored

Notes: This figure plots the mean perception of being monitored reported by workers in different treatment groups, using data from the worker survey.