

Spatial Externalities, Inefficiency, and Sufficient Statistics

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AEA P&P Developments in Infrastructure and Transportation Session

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- Local spatial externalities widespread in spatial, urban, and transportation settings
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 - Negative: EV charging queues, traffic congestion delays, local air pollution

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 - Are results driven by functional form or empirical moments?
 - What can we learn with objects estimated around an unpriced equilibrium?

This paper

- Sufficient statistics in model with spatial externalities
 - Show large externalities, large own- elasticity, and **small** deadweight loss can coexist
 - Derive appropriate version of “Harberger triangle”
 - Highlight flexible substitution patterns essential for modeling and empirical work

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Related Literature:

- Builds on classic Harberger (1964) *The Measurement of Waste*
- “Sufficient statistics” approach in public finance (Chetty, 2009; Kleven, 2021)
- Non-parametric impact of shocks in macro, trade, spatial (Baqae & Farhi, 2020; Donald et al., 2024; Hulten, 1978)

Equilibrium Model of Location Choice with Spatial Externalities

- Unit mass of agents. Agent ω picks location $k \in \{1, \dots, M\}$ with indirect utility

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- Assumptions: F continuously differentiable and $\sum_k \pi_k = 1$
- Allow for flexible substitution patterns across locations (not only logit)

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- Deterministic utility u_k sum of three components

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3. **transfers:** c_k , location-specific, redistributed lump sum

Equilibrium and Welfare

- Equilibrium (u, π) given transfers c and amenities u^0 (vector notation, e.g. $u = (u_k)_k$)

$$u = u^0 + e(\pi) + c$$

$$\pi = F(u)$$

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- Welfare: utilitarian with transfers redistributed lump-sum

$$W(c) = \mathbb{E} \max_k [u_k + \epsilon_k(\omega)] - c' \pi$$

Model Applications and Limitations

- Applications: settings with *multi-dimensional* and *spatial* externalities:
 - road traffic congestion, peak-hour traffic congestion (departure time)
 - queuing (local externality): EV charging stations, port choice.
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 - does not nest quant economic geography models (Allen & Arkolakis, 2024)
 - local prices change economics of lump-sum redistribution (Donald et al., 2024; Fajgelbaum & Gaubert, 2020)
 - no supply side market prices for locations/ goods (such as housing prices)

Two Key Matrices Help Describe Local Changes Around Eqm

1. Slutsky demand substitution matrix

$$D \equiv \frac{d\pi}{du} = \left(\frac{d\pi_i}{du_j} \right)_{ij}$$

- How much does location i share change from *increase* in transfer at j ?
- D positive semi-definite, positive diagonal, non-positive off-diagonal, zero rows sum

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2. Marginal externalities

$$E' \equiv \frac{de(\pi)}{d\pi} = \left(\frac{de_i(\pi)}{d\pi_j} \right)_{ij}$$

- E_{ji} = marginal externality of an agent at j on any agent at i
- no restrictions on sign of E_{ji}

Equilibrium Impact of Transfers

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- **Assumption 1.** All eigenvalues of $E'D$ are less than 1 in absolute value.
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with *equilibrium elasticity* matrix:

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The change in welfare is:

$$dW = \underbrace{(E\pi - c)'}_{\text{net externality}} d\pi$$

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- For empirics: estimate matrices E and D (or K) with variation around current equilibrium

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Key implications:

- For empirics: estimate matrices E and D (or K) with variation around current equilibrium
- For modeling: allow flexible D, E matrices (logit: $D = \text{diag}(\pi) - \pi\pi'$)

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Approximating Deadweight Loss

- Move further away from current eqm with 2nd order Taylor approx at $c = 0$

⇒ *More general statement*

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and deadweight loss is approximately

$$DWL \equiv W(c^{so}) - W(0) \approx -\frac{1}{2} (c^{so})' \underbrace{(EK - I)' K}_R c^{so}$$

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Relation to Harberger (1964)

- Harberger (1964) studies DWL in an efficient economy with taxes and finds

$$DWL \approx \frac{1}{2} \sum_{ij} \tau_i \tau_j K_{ij} = \frac{1}{2} \tau' \underbrace{K \tau}_{\Delta \pi}$$

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- We offer two intuitive ways to interpret our result (and Harberger's)

Intuition for the Magnitude of Deadweight Loss 1/2

- R is negative-semidefinite with row sum 0. We can rewrite

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 - Just one condition not enough!
- Still “ $DWL \approx \frac{1}{2} \text{elasticity} \times \text{externality}$ ” but with appropriate definition of these terms

Intuition for the Magnitude of Deadweight Loss 2/2

- With $\Delta\pi = \pi^{so} - \pi^0$

$$DWL \approx \frac{1}{2}(c^{so})'\Delta\pi - \frac{1}{2}(\Delta\pi)'E\Delta\pi$$

1. first term is Harberger: taxes = **lack** of externality pricing

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 - E.g. for local congestion (negative diagonal E) the inefficiency is *higher*
 - In general, correction term can be positive/negative

Example 1: Local Congestion and Capacity Expansions

- **Local congestion:** $e_j(\pi) = e(\pi_j/\kappa_j)$ where κ_j is **capacity** at site j , $e' < 0$
- Examples: queues to access port services, EV chargers

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- Equilibrium utility changes smaller than partial-eqm (in L2 norm)
- Highlights importance of demand substitution matrix D .

Example 2: Peak-Hour Road Traffic Congestion

- Kreindler (2024) studies peak-hour road traffic congestion
- Locations $k \Leftrightarrow$ **departure time** h

Departure rates $\pi(h) \rightarrow$ travel times $T(h) \rightarrow$ utilities $u(h) \rightarrow \pi$

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 - Externality $e(\pi, \zeta^A)$. Longer travel time effect depends on already arriving early vs late

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 - Externality $e(\pi, \zeta^A)$. Longer travel time effect depends on already arriving early vs late
- Equilibrium conditions depend on ideal arrival time ζ^A

$$u(\zeta) = u^0(\zeta) + e(\pi, \zeta) + c, \forall \zeta$$

$$\pi = \int F(u(\zeta), \zeta) dG(\zeta)$$

$\Rightarrow$ *Utility function*

Example 2: Peak-Hour Road Traffic Congestion

- Similar method to approximate deadweight loss: integrate over ζ^A

$$DWL \approx (c^{so})'(I - M_{ED} - M_{EDE'}K)'Kc^{so}$$

where

$$c^{so} = (I - M_{ED} - M_{EDE'}K)^{-1}M_{E\pi^0}$$

$$K = (I - M'_{ED})^{-1}M_D$$

$$M_D = \int D(\zeta^A)dG(\zeta^A)$$

$$M_{E\pi^0} = \int E(\zeta^A)\pi^0(\zeta^A)dG(\zeta^A)$$

$$M_{ED} = \int E(\zeta^A)D(\zeta^A)dG(\zeta^A)$$

$$M_{EDE'} = \int E(\zeta^A)D(\zeta^A)E(\zeta^A)'dG(\zeta^A)$$

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⇒ *Optimal charges*

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- Small DWL with both approaches

	(1) Welfare (INR)	(2) DWL (INR)	(3) DWL (%)
Nash	-405		
Social Optimum (Full Model)	-399	5.8	1.4%
Social Optimum (2nd Order)	-412	7.7	1.9%

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Example 2: Peak-Hour Road Traffic Congestion

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- Compare full structural model to 2nd order approximation (holding D , E matrices fixed)
- Small DWL with both approaches
- We slightly overestimate DWL

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Discussion

- What can we learn about externalities with **variation around unpriced eqm**?
- **Sufficient statistics** for small charges, optimum, and deadweight loss
- Expressions highlight importance of allowing for **flexible substitution patterns**
- Future work: use these expressions to evaluate robustness of model and variation

Impact of Local Charges — Intuition Back


- What is the local effect of imposing charges?
- Imagine that agents observe current charges and externalities at discrete intervals, and modify preferences
 - at time $t = 0$, locations get additional charges $c = (c_k)_k$
 - In period 1, agents move across locations by $\Delta\pi^1 = Dc$
 - In period 2, they observe additional externalities $E'\Delta\pi^1$ and further move by $\Delta\pi^2 = DE'\Delta\pi^1 = DE'Dc$
 - So on... In period n , agents move by $\Delta\pi^n = D(E'D)^{n-1}c$
 - Overall change in preferences is $\Delta\pi = \Delta\pi^1 + \Delta\pi^2 + \Delta\pi^3 + \dots$
- For convergence, we require $\Delta\pi^n \rightarrow 0$ or equivalently $(E'D)^n \rightarrow 0$

- Can use Prop. 1 to identify optimal “small” charges
- Under restriction that the induced “migration” $d\pi = Kdc$ is small ($\|d\pi\|_2 \leq \eta$), optimal charges that maximally increase welfare satisfy $d\pi = Kdc \propto E\pi - c$
- Can also solve for bounded $\|c\|_2$

$$u(h, T, \zeta^A) = -\alpha T - \beta_E |h + T - \zeta^A|_- - \beta_L |h + T - \zeta^A|_+ \\ u(h, \zeta^A) = \mathbb{E}_{T \sim \mathcal{T}(h)} u(h, T, \zeta^A) - p(h) + \varepsilon(h)$$


- departure time h , ideal arrival time ζ^A
- travel time T drawn from distribution $\mathcal{T}(h)$
 - $\mathcal{T}$ lognormal, $\mathbb{E}_{T \sim \mathcal{T}(h)} T$ depends on full traffic profile π , variance depends on mean.
- $p(h)$ are departure-time charges
- $\varepsilon(h)$ are Gumbel(σ) iid shocks

Optimal Congestion Charges in Full vs Approximation Models [⌕ Back](#)



Example of Local Demand Substitution [⌂ Back](#)

“Experiment:” pay bonus of 50 INR (≈ 0.75 USD) for leaving at 8am



Deadweight loss - full expression [⊕ Back](#)

Proposition: Adding charges c to an unpriced initial equilibrium modifies welfare according to (up to second order in charges)¹

$$W(c) - W(0) = (E^0 \pi^0)' K^0 c + \frac{1}{2} c' A c + o(c^3)$$

$$A = (E^0 \pi^0)' \frac{dK^0}{dc} + \left(\frac{dE^0}{d\pi} \pi^0 K^0 + E^0 K^0 - 1 \right)' K^0$$

All terms in A are evaluated at the unpriced equilibrium. When A is positive semi-definite, welfare is maximized by socially optimal charges c^{so} satisfying $(K^0)' E^0 \pi^0 + A c^{so} \approx 0$. The deadweight loss up to the second order in c^{so} is

$$DWL \equiv W(c^{so}) - W(0) \approx -\frac{1}{2} (c^{so})' \left[(E^0 \pi^0)' \underbrace{\frac{dK^0}{dc}}_{\text{tensor}} + \left[\underbrace{\frac{dE^0}{d\pi}}_{\text{tensor}} \pi^0 K^0 + (E^0 K^0 - I)' \right] K^0 \right] c^{so}$$

¹ $\frac{dK^0}{dc}$ and $\frac{dE^0}{d\pi}$ are tensors such that $[\frac{dK^0}{dc} e]_{ij} = \sum_k \frac{dK^0_{ik}}{dc_j} e_k$

Deadweight loss - approximation Back

Assumption 2: All eigenvalues of $ED + E D$ less than 1 in absolute value.

Assumption 3: There exists a unique equilibrium for any charges c .

Assumption 4: E and D are approximately constant around $c = 0$. Precisely, there exists a ball B_r of radius r such that for any $c_1, c_2 \in B_r$, $\frac{dE^{c_1}}{d\pi} \pi^{c_1} \ll E^0$ and $\frac{dK^{c_1}}{dc} c_2 \ll K^0$

Proposition: Let assumptions 1,2,3,4 hold for E, D evaluated at unpriced equilibrium. Additionally, assume that $E\pi^0, (1 - EK)^{-1} E\pi^0 \in B_r$. Then, the socially optimal charges that maximize welfare are given by

$$c^{so} \approx (1 - EK)^{-1} E\pi^0$$

and the deadweight loss is

$$DWL \approx -\frac{1}{2} (c^{so})' (EK^0 - 1)' K^0 c^{so}$$